One of the most crucial issues occupying students of the international law of war has been that of the legitimate means which may be employed in the process of using force to achieve objectives in the international arena. This issue is currently subject to renewed interest in the wake of the proliferation of revolutionary wars and the threat inherent in recourse to nuclear weapons. The purpose of the present article is to examine this in a comprehensive fashion in the light of these new developments with a view to determining whether the jus in bello still offers a viable framework for the restraint of conduct by parties engaged in armed conflict. In order to facilitate presentation, an analytical historical summary is provided prior to the discussion of the relevant contemporary legal questions.
The environment has been descriptionbed as the house created on earth for living things, ecology as the science of planetary housekeeping, and, building on these definitions, environmental law as the law of planetary housekeeping - as such environmental law is concerned with protecting the earth and its inhabitants from activities that upset its life-sustaining capacities. It is in this context of planetary housekeeping that it is submitted that the right to environmental integrity is a basic human right deserving of legal protection at the highest possible level, and that is by constitutional entrenchment. This submission is postulated on the following premises, namely that there is an urgent need to halt and, if possible, reverse environmental degradation; and the law has a primary function to play in controlling environmental debasement, albeit a complementary role to the roles played by education, economics and administrative policy. The roles of the executive branch of government andof the courts in the protection of the environment are briefly reviewed in this article. It is submitted that there is a clear need for adoption of the constitutional option of entrenching a conservation ethic in a bill of rights, as opposed to mere declarations of policy as envisaged in the Draft Bill on Environment Conservation.
The principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources forms part of the general principles of public international law, and is on a par with, for instance, the principle of self-determination. The development of the modalities of the principle have however changed considerably over the years, and in this process economic cooperation towards development has been substituted for absolute economic sovereignty as part of the economic self determination of states. It is precisely because of this shift in emphasis, that the legal status of the most important modalities of this principle, namely those concerning the nationalisation of foreign interests, remain unclear. Although resolution 1803 (XVII) was not seen to be a departure from accepted public international law principles at the time of its adoption, the same cannot be said of the provisions of later resolutions. In those resolutions the international principle of compensation was attacked and finally abandoned in art 2(2)(c) of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (CERDS). This development is now proclaimed especially by socialist and Third World countries to refelct either current public international law or public international law leges ferenda.
This contribution shows that South Africa has two choice-of-Iaw regimes governing aspects of the corporate phenomenon. In deciding how (if at all) the existing arrangements could be improved there are constant and variable factors to contend with. One constant factor is the distinction which is drawn, and must be retained, between corporations which do business in South Africa and corporations which establish a place of business in the Republic. Another constant factor is that the personal law of a corporation predominates in the choice-of-Iaw rules which apply to "foreign corporations". The main variable factor is South African law. It is variable both in regard to its applicability or non-applicability and to the extent of its applicability. When the two choice-of-Iaw regimes are assessed with specific reference to the constant and variable factors, it emerges that, realistically, it is only the hybrid (South African law/personal law) choice-of-Iaw rules which apply to "external companies" that could be adjusted. More particularly, it is the South African law component of this choice-of-law regime that can be adjusted freely. It follows, of course, that any adjustment which is made to the South African law component would have a converse effect on the parameters of the personal law component.
There are two possible criticisms of direct appeals to a court of appeal. The first is that it would add to costs. This would only be so if advocates charge more for appearing in the appeal court, and there is no real reason for that. The appeal court would probably tighten up on records and procedure: any increased costs here should be made up by a saving in court time. The second possible criticism would be that appellants would be denied a further appeal. This is offset by the point that they would be able to go direct to the final court, and that without the costs of two appeals. If there were only the one court of appeal, hearing appeals direct from the trial courts, much, if not all, depends on those who would sit on the court. Neither Botswana nor Bophuthatswana has yet reached the stage where the expense of permanent judges of appeal can be justified. But neither would want to forego the prestige brought by the import of judges or distinction.
In this contribution the current legal developments in Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, South Africa, South Africa/ Namibia, Transkei, Venda, Zambia and Zimbabwe with regards to principal legislation, government notices and judicial decisions are briefly descriptionbed.