The chaos in legal theory on the sources of international law has increased over the years. As indicated in this article, one of the main causes for this unhappy state of affairs is the obsession to construct an international legal order that could mirror the effectiveness of the municipal legal order in the creation of binding and valid legal norms. However, the absence of law-creating organs in the international legal order similar to those active in municipal legal systems had to be compensated for by artificial constructions if this were to succeed. This resulted in a scramble for all kinds of theories on the origin of binding and valid legal norms, which caused more confuSion than it solved. A further result is the utter confusion in which terms such as 'source' and 'validity' are used. Perhaps the whole theory surrounding legal sources in international law is in serious need of a profound reconsideration.
This article focuses on the loss of objects of artistic or other cultural significance. This loss may refer to theft, misappropriation, abuse of authority or fraud on the part of agents, borrowers, restorers or curators. For better or for worse, the legal distinction between stolen and illegally exported objects dominates the topic of the protection of cultural objects. The question of illegal export refers to theft of certain objects only. The dividing line between theft and illegal export becomes more tenuous when false permits are issued. Theft falls squarely within the paradigm of a property rule which prevents forced transfers, but allows voluntary alienation. While this article is not concerned with the legal, anthropological and psychological dimensions of restitution of national patrimony to the nation of origin, concentrating on traditional legal actions in respect of property stolen in the traditional sense, the shadows which the property rule casts in this field are exposed.
With the dawn of a new era in South Africa, and the commencement of the new constitution, principles previously foreign to the South African legal system have emerged. These are inter alia the supremacy of the constitution, as opposed to the parliamentary supremacy of the past, and enforceable human rights. The fundamental questions surrounding the content of human rights standards and the role of the state in the exercise of such rights, should be considered in interpreting the constitution. This includes the question as to the sphere of application of the constitutionally enshrined rights, as this will determine the level of protection ensured to the individual via the constitution. Human rights may be defined as a constitutional and international law concept, aimed at defending, in an institutionalised way, the rights of persons, natural and juristic, against excesses of power committed by state organs. 'Constitutional' human rights (that is human rights entrenched in a constitution) should be distinguished from 'non-constitutional' human rights (that is human rights in a private sphere by way of civil rights Act or code). This article deals with 'constitutional' human rights.
This article comes at the end of a year of study and research in the United States. For the first time during this year, the author came into contact with feminism as a comprehensive legal critique, with clear and lucid challenges to every aspect of legal theory that should be an essential part of any law school curriculum. As the author started his journey into feminist critique, he soon discovered that at the moment, the feminist movement in the United States is being rocked by claims by African American and other feminists of colour, that the mainstream feminist movement has marginalised women of colour to such an extent that they have become invisible. To think that the women's movement in the United States presents a single united front, the argument goes, disempowers women of colour. In this article he examines the on-going debate in the United States, and its implications for both the internal unity in the women's movement and its agenda. He draws some superficial analogies with the South African women's movement.
The human rights debate in Africa is neither geographically misplaced nor regionally ill conceived. Accordingly, the author examines the freedom of political activity in Botswana which, in sharp contrast to other African states, has been internationally commended for a good record of human rights protection and thriving democracy.
In this contribution the current legal developments in Ciskei, Transkei, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland and Zimbabwe with regards to principal legislation, government notices and judicial decisions are briefly descriptionbed.