In 2006 (July) DR 12, Richard Rosenthal pointed out inadequacies in the Cape Law Society's Rule 21 - the role that requires all members of the Society to do 24 hours of pro bono work a year. He believes the rule could have been better drafted.
Imagine the following situation: Your client is a young. successful. and ambitious person. He is a few years away from qualifying as an orthopaedic surgeon. and from being financially strong and independent. Then. one morning on his way to work, an accident occurs, through no fault of his own. Doctors say he is lucky to be alive, but his injuries are severe and he will unfortunately never be able to work again. Although he survived the accident, the question now is: Will he survive financially, in terms of the recently promulgated Road Accident Fund Amendment Act 19 of 2005 (the RAF Amendment Act)?
I have noted the provisions to curtail the benefits enjoyed by victims of road accidents in terms of the Road Accident Fund Act (RAF) 56 of 1996 by the promulgation of the Road Accident Fund Amendment Act 19 of 2005. My concern is that the proposals are directed at the wrong end of the RAF's expenditure. The RAF Commission under the chairmanship of Judge Kathy Satchwell has found that approximately 40% to 55% of each rand of fuel levy is spent by the RAF on evaluating claims and on administration. These figures are based on information for the period 2000 to 2002. This figure does not take into account the attorney-and-client fee charged by the claimant's own attorney. It follows that the actions - or even inaction - of the RAF that may adversely influence this already unfavourable ratio of costs in relation to compensation actually delivered should be closely monitored and effective steps taken to rectify any deficiencies in the claims-handl1ing process, before one resorts to the drastic step of reducing road accident victim benefits.
An exception is a pleading in which a party objects to the summons or plea, as the case may be, on the basis of an inherent defect in the formulation of the particulars of claim in the summons, or of the plea. The object is to cut the proceedings short, because it is unfair to put the aggrieved party, who is prejudiced in the conduct of his case by a defect in the summons or plea, through the expense of the whole process. Exceptions provide a useful mechanism to weed out cases without legal merit (Telematrix (Pty) Ltd t/a Matrix Vehicle Tracking v Advertising Standards Authority SA 2006 (1) SA 461 (SCA) par 3 at 465H).
The judgments in the matters of Computer Brilliance CC v Swanepoel 2005 (4) SA 433 (T) and FirstRand Bank Ltd v Pather 2005 (4) SA 429 (N) of which a detailed account is given in 2005 (Oct) DR 34; See also 2005 (Dec) DR 27 have curbed the absolute right of defendants to claim security in terms of r 62 (1)(c) when litigating against close corporations and companies in the magistrate's courts. It has been accepted practice in the magistrate 's court for many years that a defendant has an absolute right to claim security in such cases by delivery of a notice in terms of r 62 (1)(c).
Section 35(3) of the Constitution entitles an accused person, in addition to a right to a speedy and public trial before an ordinary court of law, a right to adduce and challenge evidence. The rights under s 35(3) attract responsibilities on the court before which an accused appears, and bestow both positive and negative duties on the judicial officer, who should at all times remain vigilant and ensure that justice is entirely observed from the beginning to the conclusion of the trial.
In 2006 (Sept) DR 47, I examined some of the many taxation problems faced by individual taxpayers who sold homes that were held in corporate entities or trusts and that were acquired prior to I October 2001, so as to take advantage of a tax loophole that prevailed prior to that date. What that article did not consider, though, was the aftermath of such a sale. The poor taxpayer is left with an empty trust or corporate entity that he no longer needs, nor wants, and in respect of which he incurs substantial administrative costs in keeping it alive.
In a reserved judgment handed down on 2 August 2006 (Khan & Others v Minister of Home Affairs & Others (T) case 15303/06 unreported) the court considered aspects of the process employed by the Department of Home Affairs to enforce the Immigration Act 13 of 2002, and, more particularly, to deport 'illegal foreigners'. The case arose from the much-publicised arrest of a number of persons by Home Affairs officials outside the Pretoria High Court, who had gone there to watch proceedings in the so-called 'Rashid' matter.
This article will provide a broad overview of the procedure to follow when an application for the subdivision of a farm portion or agricultural holding is lodged in the Gauteng Province. The procedures differ between the provinces and other articles in the series will provide the background on the procedures to be followed in the other provinces.