n IFE PsychologIA : An International Journal - Why the knowledge argument is wrong

Volume 21, Issue 2
  • ISSN : 1117-1421



This paper examines the knowledge argument as one of the dualists' arguments that support the view that properties of mental states are separable from the properties of the central nervous system. The knowledge argument is used to establish that there are epistemic gaps that separate the two kinds of properties. Physicalism affirms that there is no separation. This paper argues to challenge the veracity of the knowledge argument. It affirms the physicalists' claim that phenomenal truths do not entail different ontological commitments from the one ascertained by physical truths.

Loading full text...

Full text loading...


Article metrics loading...


This is a required field
Please enter a valid email address
Approval was a Success
Invalid data
An Error Occurred
Approval was partially successful, following selected items could not be processed due to error