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- Volume 2014, Issue 1, 2014
Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg - Volume 2014, Issue 1, 2014
Volume 2014, Issue 1, 2014
Die bronne van die Suid-Afrikaanse sakereg en die invloed van die Grondwet van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika, 1996 op die regsontwikkeling in hierdie gebied van die privaatregAuthor Susan ScottSource: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 2014, pp 1 –25 (2014)More Less
The sources of South African property law
This contribution is based on the inaugural lecture delivered on 25 Maart 2013 on her acceptance of the exchange professorship: Zuid-Afrika - Lage Landen (België en Nederland) - 2012/2013. This initiative was introduced by the Tijdschrift voor Privaatreg in 2011 to facilitate exchange between Dutch and Afrikaans speaking legal academics.
In this article the author examines the sources of the South African property law with special reference to the influence of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 on these respective sources. Emphasis falls on the far-reaching influence of the constitution on the legal system with particular reference to the law of property. As an introduction noteworthy aspects of the legal system are briefly referred to. Readers are reminded of the fact that South African law is regarded as a mixed legal system with roots both in Roman-Dutch and English law. The influence of the multicultural nature of the society on the legal development is also addressed. Sections 8, 9, 25 and 26 of the constitution are highlighted as particularly significant for the development of and change in property law over the last decade.
The author deals with the sources of property law in the following order: the constitution, 1996; legislation; case law; the common law (Roman-Dutch law) or African customary law and textbooks or academic literature. Certain contentious issues in each of these sources are discussed briefly. Thereafter a few selected examples illustrate the influence of the constitution on property law.
The author calls attention to the penetrating and far-reaching influence that the constitution has had on the development of property law in South Africa. Particular emphasis falls on section 25 (the property clause) and section 26 (the housing clause), which so far have had by far the strongest influence on modern property law.
The position and disregard for Afrikaans as a developed legal language receives attention: both in legislation and in the courts Afrikaans (as well as other indigenous languages) are grossly neglected contrary to the protection afforded to all the official languages. Brief reference is made to the disturbing way in which judges have been appointed recently. The author refers to problematic aspects of applying African customary law and the role played by the Critical Legal Studies movement is noted with serious concern.
The author hails the comprehensive influence of the constitution on the law of property as a salutary one which improves the lives of all citizens. Although it protects the rights of all citizens equally, the constitution is particularly sensitive to the needs and position of the weak and vulnerable component of society, which is welcomed in view of the past. The author nevertheless cautions that despite the laudable aspirations of the constitution, the South African society is far from the perfect society envisaged by the drafters of the constitution.
Author J. NeethlingSource: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 2014, pp 26 –44 (2014)More Less
Protection of the personality rights of state prisoners
The point of departure for the protection of the personality rights of prisoners in our law is that, apart from the fact that their right to liberty has been restricted by their imprisonment, prisoners have all other personality rights at their disposal - the so-called residuum principle - and is entitled to the protection thereof except where a right has been taken away from them by law, expressly or by implication, or where the right in question is necessarily inconsistent with the circumstances in which they have been placed.
Personality rights of prisoners that already enjoy recognition and protection are the rights to bodily freedom, physical-psychological integrity and privacy, as well as the fundamental right to human dignity. It is generally accepted that the prison authorities may not infringe these rights by positive conduct or an omission where there was a legal duty to act. With regard to the physical-mental integrity, it is recognised that warders have a legal duty, based on common law, statutory and constitutional imperatives, to see to the welfare of inmates. There is no reason why other rights of personality (such as the rights to dignity, reputation and identity) should not also be protected.
Infringement of protected personality rights is in the absence of a ground of justification (such as official or statutory authority and volenti non fit iniuria) wrongful. There are on the one hand strong indications in case law that liability for the wrongful infringement of a prisoner's rights of personality to physical liberty, physical-psychological integrity and privacy is strict. On the other hand there are various decisions which set at least negligence as a requirement for liability for the infringement of their physical integrity, and in one case even of their bodily freedom. However, the latter approach is questionable for the following policy considerations.
As a result of the extremely unequal relation between the prison authorities and prisoners, the inmates are largely at the mercy of their goalers or as it was put in one decision, "it is no holiday to be in prison in South Africa". Consequently prisoners are among the most vulnerable in our society to the failure of the state to protect their rights. Justice and fairness therefore demand that the state should be strictly liable and that prisoners should not be burdened with the sometimes very difficult onus of proving negligence on the side of the prison authorities.
Source: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 2014, pp 45 –65 (2014)More Less
The property of another cannot be pledged or mortgaged unless with the owner's consent
The registration of transfer of immovable property pursuant to a fraud perpetrated on the legitimate owner is an empty gesture with no legal consequences as far as the material real rights of the parties involved are concerned. Unless the owner forms the subjective animus transferendi domini the formal completion of the transfer formalities and even the administrative registration of the transfer in the deeds office remain an ineffective paper exercise. No real right of ownership vests in the transferee as a consequence of such a pretence. Registration does not guarantee title, and if it is effected as a result of a feigned power of attorney or of an outright fraud thanks to a falsified signature of the rightful owner, the right apparently created, is no right at all.
What applies to the transfer of ownership as mother right applies equally to the vesting of a limited real right such as a mortgage bond or pledge. Unless the mortgagor or pledgor is the owner of the property ostensibly intended to be bonded by the mortgage or pledge, and subjectively has the intention of vesting a limited real right over his property in the mortgagee or pledgee, the mere completion of the formalities of registering the presumed mortgage (or passing of possession in the case of a pledge) does not vest a limited real right in the intended mortgagee or pledgee. The requirement of a real agreement cannot be circumvented in an abstract system with regard to any derivative mode of acquisition of any real rights, and the prevailing opinion is that no limited real right of security can be vested in an original mode. The underlying principle is encapsulated in the Latin adage res aliena pignori dari non potest, which follows logically from the other well-known principle captured in the phrase nemo plus iuris ad alium transferre potest quam ipse haberet.
As a consequence of these principles, the pledgee is not entitled to transfer the limited real right of pledge to a cessionary of the underlying claim. This is the position even if the pledgor happens to be the debtor of the underlying debt that was secured by the pledge. On cession of the claim the ceded right vests in the cessionary, but as an unsecured claim, and the owner of the erstwhile pledged property may vindicate his property from the former pledgee. Only the owner can vest a limited real right in another, and the pledgee lacks the necessary entitlement. The principle that a security right is accessory to the underlying claim does not result in an abrogation of the overriding principle that without the necessary entitlement (ius disponendi) nobody can effect a limited real right over someone else's property - res aliena pignori dari non potest. The thief can no more vest a real right of pledge over the stolen car than transfer the ownership of the car to another, even though he may ostensibly allow the other party to take possession of the car - and the latter, notwithstanding his innocence and bona fides, will in general have no remedy against the rei vindicatio of the true owner.
It is submitted in this contribution, notwithstanding the foregoing accepted principles of property law, that in exceptional circumstances the creditor who has been misled by the misrepresentation of the true owner regarding the perceived entitlement of the pretender with regard to the owner's property, either positively by his actions (commissio) or by his neglect (omissio) as owner to intervene timeously to rectify the wrong impression that another is the owner and consequently entitled to mortgage the property deemed to be the latter's as security for credit provided, may be estopped from vindicating his property unless the perceived mortgagee is compensated. It is submitted that there is scope to recognise that South African law has developed to the point where a new original mode of acquisition of a limited real right such as a mortgage bond is effective whenever all the requirements of estoppel have been met. This would follow from a consistent application of the reasoning of the supreme court of appeal in the Oriental Products case and could have qualified the recent judgment of the supreme court of appeal in Nedbank v Mendelow.
This principle may be applied where the executor of the deceased estate neglected to intervene timeously to rectify the false impression created by the fraudulent public registration in the deed's office of the perceived transfer of ownership, and this omission enabled the fraudster to misrepresent to a potential credit provider that he is entitled to mortgage the property as security for the credit provided. The mislead party may as estoppel assertor bar the rei vindicatio of the executor on behalf of the estate. It is inherently unfair to allow the beneficiaries effectively to benefit from the failure of the executor of the deceased's estate to act timeously. This is especially so when it will be at the cost of the bona fides of the perceived mortgagee as the third party who acted as the reasonable person, because there was nothing to put him on his guard that there was anything untoward regarding the entitlement of the perceived mortgagor to burden the property. This is particularly so if the fraudster stands to benefit from his own fraud under the guise of being one of the beneficiaries of the estate - notwithstanding the fact that he personally fraudulently falsified the deceased's signature to result in the misrepresentation regarding the ownership of the seemingly mortgaged property. Nobody should stand to benefit from his own misconduct.
Author K. MalanSource: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 2014, pp 66 –84 (2014)More Less
'n Ontleding van die regsbeskermingswaardige belange met betrekking tot taal
In die mate waarin die vraag na die regsbeskermingswaardige belange met betrekking tot taal aandag geniet, geskied dit grootliks op sterkte van die oortuiging dat belange rakende taal in individue setel en dat individuele regte derhalwe wesenlik toereikend is om alle belange rakende taal te beskerm. Ofskoon individuele regte in die taalkonteks ongetwyfeld belangrik is, is daar ten minste twee nie-individuele belange waarna individuele regte nie behoorlik kan omsien nie. Die eerste is die taalgemeenskap, in die besonder die gemeenskappe van moedertaalsprekers wie se gemeenskaplike identiteit in beduidende mate deur hul gemeenskaplike taal gedefinieer word en wat derhalwe 'n gemeenskaplike belang in hul taal het, welke belang nie individueel verdeelbaar is nie en nie na enige spesifieke individu, losstaande van ander herlei kan word nie. Die tweede belang is die taal self, wat noodwendig in stand gehou moet word ten einde sowel individuele as gemeenskapsbelange in die taal moontlik te maak. Hierdie twee nie-individuele belange kan alleenlik toereikend deur instellings en fasiliteite geakkommodeer word, wat na hulle aard anders as individuele regte is en dit te bowe gaan. Die hoofdoel en inhoud van die onderhawige bespreking is juis om hierdie nie-individuele belange rakende taal toe te lig. Daar word gevolglik aangevoer dat:
- taal 'n meta-reg is, dit wil sê die grondslag en bestaansvoorwaarde vir bykans alle individuele regte;
- die openbare en veral beraadslagende en besluitnemende aanwending van die taal van ten minste alle getal-gewys beduidende taalgemeenskappe in 'n staat 'n voorwaarde vir die beoefening van demokratiese politiek is;
- tale 'n bron van sosiale solidariteit vir (taal)gemeenskappe is, dat tale gemeenskappe definieer en meer nog dat tale, in die besonder geskrewe (letterkundige) tale, gemeenskappe oor geslagte heen met mekaar in kontak hou, bind en stabiliseer en dat elke letterkundige taal gevolglik die aard van outonome transgenerasie-artefakte aanneem wat deels outonoom van enige spesifieke (lewende) generasie bestaan. Gevolglik bestaan 'n taalgemeenskap in wese in die literatuur wat sy lede oor geslagte heen opgelewer het; en
- dat elke taal oor inherente waarde beskik en die aard aanneem van die kollektiewe intellektuele goedere van die betrokke gemeenskap en dat alle tale gesamentlik die aard van 'n kollektiewe stel intellektuele goedere aanneem wat die universele mensdom toekom.
Author T. BekkerSource: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 2014, pp 85 –99 (2014)More Less
Die tersydestelling van vonnisse by wyse van toestemming - 'n kritiese ontleding
As algemene gemeenregtelike reël word 'n Suid-Afrikaanse hof functus officio nadat 'n finale uitspraak gelewer is en het die hof daarna geen bevoegdheid om die uitspraak te wysig, ter syde te stel of aan te vul nie. Daar word egter in sowel die hooggeregshof as die landdroshowe voorsiening gemaak vir die tersydestelling van vonnisse in sekere beperkte omstandighede. In die hooggeregshof kan 'n vonnis gewysig of tersyde gestel word ingevolge reël 31(2)(b), reël 42 of die gemenereg. In die landdroshowe kan 'n vonnis gewysig of tersyde gestel word ingevolge die gronde uiteengesit in artikel 36, saamgelees met reël 49, wat die prosedure uiteensit wat gevolg moet word ten einde vonnisse tersyde te stel.
In alle gevalle moet 'n applikant kan aantoon dat daar 'n voldoende of goeie rede is om die vonnis tersyde te stel. Dit behels eerstens die verskaffing van 'n redelike en aanvaarbare verduideliking vir sy verstek en tweedens dat hy op die meriete van die hoofaksie 'n bona fide verweer het wat prima facie oor 'n gedeeltelike vooruitsig op sukses beskik. Hierdie beginsels is verder uitgebrei in die landdroshowe waar reël 49(5) voorsiening maak dat 'n vonnis tersyde gestel kan word op grond van die toestemming van die vonnisskuldeiser. Hierdie bepaling het tot 'n aantal teenstrydige beslissings aanleiding gegee wat uitgeloop het op 'n situasie waar daar tans verskillende benaderings gevolg word in die hoë en landdroshowe.
Hierdie artikel fokus op die algemene beginsels van toepassing op die tersydestelling van vonnisse by wyse van toestemming in die Suid-Afrikaanse siviele prosesreg. Dit bevat voorts 'n kritiese ontleding van die verskillende beslissings wat daarop betrekking het en die huidige posisie in verband met die verskillende benaderings wat in die hooggeregshof en landdroshowe gevolg word. Sekere aanbevelings word gemaak ten einde die huidige posisie reg te stel deur voorsiening te maak vir eenvormigheid in die benadering ten aansien van die tersydestelling van vonnisse by wyse van toestemming.
Author J.M. OttoSource: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 2014, pp 100 –116 (2014)More Less
This article deals with a commercial instrument that was a very popular form of investment in the Netherlands at one stage. It is called the effectenlease in Dutch. It consists of the following: A bank or other financial institution lends money to a client. The purpose of the loan is to buy shares and other financial instruments such as bonds over a period of time. In this way the client builds up a portfolio. The loan attracts interest at a relatively high rate. The loan period could vary between five years and twenty years. The bank remains owner of the shares until the loan is repaid in full. The loan is repayable by means of instalments. These contracts were concluded on a large scale and huge amounts of euros were eventually involved. An important part of the contract between the parties was a term which provided that the client was obliged to repay the whole loan even if the value of the shares at the end of the term is less than the outstanding amount owed. Everything went fine for investors in a bullish market when the prices and values of shares and other instruments showed an upward trend. But things did not look as bright when prices started to fall and investors could not repay their loans.
The institution of the effectenlease and the responsibilities and obligations of the parties eventually landed in the hoge raad in the Netherlands. In a landmark decision, which had to serve as example for similar cases, the court decided that the clients had a duty to familiarise themselves with all the aspects and dangers involved in such contracts but that banks also had a duty to inform the clients of the risks that they are undertaking, in particular their duty to repay the loan even if the value of the shares was not satisfactory. The fact that these matters were pointed out in brochures and in the contracts themselves was not enough to satisfy the hoge raad. The court reduced the claim by the bank for the outstanding amount (and in effect similar claims in other cases) drastically. In this article the effectenlease is analysed and the question is put what type of an agreement it would constitute for purposes of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 should banks or other institutions introduce a product such as the effectenlease onto the South African commercial landscape. The definitions in the National Credit Act are analysed, interpreted and applied and the conclusion is reached that the effectenlease will be treated as a secured loan. It is also pointed out that the reckless credit provisions in the National Credit Act will play an important role should a credit provider decide to operate a scheme akin to the effectenlease.
Source: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 2014, pp 117 –129 (2014)More Less
Vruchtgebruik is een gekende rechtsfiguur in het Zuid-Afrikaanse, Belgische en Franse recht. Maar waar het eerste stelsel strikt vasthoudt aan de Romeinsrechtelijke basisprincipes, passen de twee overige de regels op meer creatieve wijze toe om tegemoet te komen aan de noden van een moderne samenleving. Vruchtgebruik wordt immers vaak gebruikt als estate planning tool, bijvoorbeeld bij een "schenking met voorbehoud van vruchtgebruik" constructie. Hierbij bestaat vaak de wens dat de vruchtgebruiker een zo groot mogelijke controle en vrijheid bij aanwending van het goed geniet. Ook het traditionele Romeinsrechtelijke vruchtgebruik leent zich hiervoor indien het soepeler wordt toegepast.
Zo pleiten auteurs voor het hanteren van de bestemming van het goed als maatstaf voor het afbakenen van de bevoegdheden van de vruchtgebruiker, waarbij daden van beschikking - in tegenstelling tot in de traditionele visie - toegelaten zijn voor de vruchtgebruiker als en voor zover ze in overeenstemming met de bestemming van het goed zijn.
Ook het frequenter toepassen van vruchtgebruik op universaliteiten kan voor de vruchtgebruiker ruimere bevoegdheden opleveren. De universaliteit als geheel is immers het voorwerp van zijn recht, waardoor hij ten aanzien van de bestanddelen beschikkingsbevoegd is.
Tenslotte kan een contractuele toepassing van het regime van quasi-vruchtgebruik op uit de aard nietverbruikbare goederen een sterkere positie aan de vruchtgebruiker verlenen. Bij quasi-vruchtgebruik wordt de teruggaveplicht in natura immers vervangen door een teruggave bij equivalent, waardoor de vruchtgebruiker niet verplicht is het goed zelf in stand te houden maar een ruimer palet aan opties heeft bij het beheren van het vruchtgebruikvermogen.
Author Roderick O'BrienSource: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 2014, pp 130 –140 (2014)More Less
In a recent survey of the discipline of comparative law, Martinek has encouraged us to think pragmatically (as well as theoretically) about comparative law. He wrote: "Comparative law has, in the first place, a very pragmatic task to pursue, namely to facilitate the commercial relationships and the administrative communication among different countries" ("Comparative jurisprudence: what good does it do?" 2013 TSAR 39 45).
Pragmatic comparative lawyers may especially be found where there are practical issues of international trade, or where the many aspects of human life cross jurisdictional boundaries. For such pragmatic comparative lawyers, an interest in the legal system of the People's Republic of China makes sense. For some years, China has been a principal trading partner for the Republic of South Africa. In addition, the human factor is given strong impetus by the recent arrival of significant numbers of Chinese citizens, adding to the longer-term Chinese emigrants to South Africa. Tourism and investment are also growth areas, bringing new tasks to our pragmatic comparative lawyer.
Author M.J. MathenjwaSource: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 2014, pp 140 –150 (2014)More Less
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 requires national and provincial governments to supervise local government. Section 155(6) requires each provincial government to provide for the monitoring of local government in the province and section 155(7) instructs the national and provincial governments to oversee the effective performance by municipalities of their functions. There are challenges which arise from the constitution and the legislation in relation to the supervision of local government. This note reveals serious shortcomings and challenges in the supervision of local government in South Africa. In spite of the fact that the constitution entrenches the status of local government such status may be useless if the mechanisms that are intended to protect the status of local government are not effective. (S 51(2) of the constitution vests both the legislative and executive authority of a municipality in its municipal council and s 40(1) provides that government in the Republic is constituted of three spheres, namely, the national, provincial and local spheres of government. Meyer Local Government Law (1997) 6 points out that the reference to local government as "a sphere of government" indicates that the 1996 constitution recognises local government as being part of a team of government together with the national and provincial spheres of government.) Despite the constitutional provisions aimed at protecting local government from the other spheres of government compromising or impeding its ability to exercise its powers or to perform its functions (in s 151(4)), provincial governments may too easily encroach on the geographical and institutional integrity of municipalities. For this reason, the weaknesses in the constitution and legislation in respect of its protection of local government from possible abuses of its supervisory powers by provincial government are discussed in this note.
Source: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 2014, pp 151 –162 (2014)More Less
It is suggested that this judgment is noteworthy, mainly for four reasons: first and foremost, the way in which Binns-Ward J, writing for the full court (Yekiso J and Savage AJ concurring), formulated the ratio decidendi: employing proper source materials - mainly case law and old authority - and not falling into the trap of merely relying on standard textbooks (for a critical appraisal of this trend, see Scott "A growing trend in source application by our courts illustrated by a recent judgment on right of way" 2013 THRHR 239). Secondly, it illustrates the fact that if more fundamental spadework had been done in the preparation of the case of the applicant (respondent in the appeal), the matter would probably not have ended up in court, although this suggestion is in some measure belied by the fact that the court of first instance actually decided in the applicant's favour (albeit erroneously, to my mind). In the third place, one is again reminded of the fact that the mandament van spolie is a remedy that has over time proved itself to possess the uncanny ability of causing confusion, in particular where it is applied to obtain redress in situations where there is an averment of spoliation of quasi-possession. Finally, it is living proof of how rich our Roman-Dutch common law is in well-established rules to resolve the most minute problems that can arise in an everyday situation flowing from normal commercial activity such as property development involving the subdivision of land in modern times.
Non-performance of constitutional obligations and the demise of the water tribunal - access to justice denied? : regspraakSource: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 2014, pp 163 –180 (2014)More Less
This note focuses on two decisions of the North Gauteng high court (Goede Wellington Boerdery (Pty) Ltd v Makhanya NO (56628/2010) (2011) (ZAGPPHC 141) and Exxaro Coal (Mpumalanga) (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Water Affairs (63939/2012) (2012)) and a decision of the supreme court of appeal (Makhanya NO and Minister of Water and Environmental Affairs v Goede Wellington Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (230/2012)  ZASCA 205 (30-11-2012)) (unreported) on the role and manner of functioning of the water tribunal established by the National Water Act 36 of 1998. The water tribunal's main purpose is to adjudicate upon appeals lodged against decisions made and directives issued in accordance with the provisions of the National Water Act. In the Goede Wellington high court case, a decision of the water tribunal was set aside on the basis of non-compliance with the rules of natural justice, which decision was confirmed on appeal. In the Goede Wellington supreme court of appeal case as well as the Exxaro North Gauteng high court case, it was determined that there was no legal basis for the minister of water affairs to direct that an appeal against a decision or directive must be referred to a mediation panel (as provided for in s 150), as the nature of appeals required that the matter could only be heard and finally adjudicated by the water tribunal. In the Exxaro case the failure of the minister to reconstitute the water tribunal was found to be unconstitutional and a contravention of the National Water Act. In conclusion a number of implications of the failure of the water tribunal to comply with the principles of administrative law as well as the refusal of the minister to reconstitute the water tribunal are highlighted.
Road blocks on the silk route
General Council of the Bar v Mansingh 2013 3 SA 294 (SCA)
Mansingh v General Council of the Bar 2014 1 BCLR ....(CC) : regspraakSource: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 2014, pp 181 –190 (2014)More Less
Conferring a senior status on certain advocates is a settled practice in South Africa. It is a product of a colonial past in which traditions and institutions of the imperial metropole were transplanted to the colonies. (See King "Senior counsels: the road to silk in Singapore" 1989 Singapore Law Review 172 (http://heinonline.org (28-6-2013)) and in respect of the introduction of the system in the former Free State and Transvaal republics after the Anglo-Boer war, Kahn "Silks" 1974 SALJ 95 98-99). Dawson states that the "retreat of the empire caused a retrenchment of prerogative power while growing republican sentiment in former British territories led to queen's counsel being renamed 'senior counsel' or 'senior advocates' in some jurisdictions" ("The rank of Queen's Council: judicial perspectives" 2013 King's Law Journal 38 52).
Afdwinging van beslissings van internasionale tribunale - die Konstitusionele Hof aan die woord
Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe v Fick 2013 5 SA 325 (KH) : regspraakAuthor E.C. SchlemmerSource: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 2014, pp 191 –201 (2014)More Less
Daar is 'n geweldige toename in internasionale tribunale en geskilbeslegtingsliggame wat almal op die een of ander wyse betrokke is by die beslegting van geskille (wat verband hou met die uitleg of verbreking van verdrae en/of die afdwinging van regte uit hoofde van verdrae) of by die vasstelling van regte uit hoofde van verdrae. Die internasionale regsomgewing ken egter nie 'n algemene struktuur soos in die geval van plaaslike howe met 'n hiërargie van regsprekende gesag ingevolge waarvan die beslissings van hierdie internasionale tribunale, indien die betrokke partye hulle nie by die beslissing hou nie, wel deur 'n hoër gesag afgedwing kan word nie. (Sien oa die besprekings oor hierdie aangeleenthede deur Guzman en ook Young "Supranational rulings as judgments and precedents" 2007-2008 Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 477; Sloss en Jinks (reds) The Role of Domestic Courts in Treaty Enforcement (2009).) Dit moet egter nie verwar word met die kwessie van die (moontlike) gebondenheid van plaaslike howe aan die beslissings van internasionale tribunale waar daar sprake is van die skepping van presedente nie en waar die internasionale tribunaal inderwaarheid as deel van die hiërargie van die howe beskou kan word nie (sien hier bv die posisie in die Europese Unie met die Europese geregshof wat beslissings kan gee wat ook direk in die lidstate van krag is en wat rigtinggewend is met betrekking tot die uitleg en ontwikkeling van die Europese reg en die reg om na hierdie hof te appelleer indien dit om Europese regsaangeleenthede sou handel (Verdrag insake die Werking van die Europese Unie (gekonsolideerde weergawe 2012/C 326/01) Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie C362 26-10-2012).
Vindisering deur ongegrond verrykte eienaar sonder meer?
Quartermark Investments (Pty) Ltd v Mkhwanazi (768/2012)  ZASCA 150 (01-11-2013) (ongerapporteer) : regspraakSource: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 2014, pp 201 –212 (2014)More Less
Die rei vindicatio is een van die kragtigste remedies in die sakereg, indien nie dié mees kragtige remedie in die reg hoegenaamd nie. So hoort dit ook in 'n regstelsel wat van ouds 'n besonder hoë premie plaas op die erkenning van en dus die beskerming van eiendomsreg. Sy eiendomsreg as moederreg vorm dikwels die kern van die bates wat die kredietwaardigheid van 'n regsubjek bepaal. Die eienaar wat in die besit van sy eiendom gesteur is, hoef slegs te bewys dat hy die eiendomsreg op die saak het, dat die saak nog in esse is én tans in die besit van die verweerder is om met dié remedie te kan slaag. Hy hoef nie aan te voer en te bewys hoekom die huidige besitter of okkupeerder van sy saak geen regtens relevante regsgrond het om in besit van sy saak te wees nie. Die verweerder mag die grondslag van sy besit en dus die regsgrond vir sy tydelike regmatige uitsluiting van die eienaar aanvoer en bewys sou dit toepaslik wees. Dit sal byvoorbeeld die geval wees as die verweerder kragtens 'n geldige huurkontrak of as vruggebruiker in besit van die eienaar se saak is. In die lig van die perpetuum-kenmerk van eiendomsreg moet alle regmatige beperkings op 'n eienaar se bevoegdhede een of ander tyd afloop. (Sien Zwalve Simplex et Perpetuum (2006).)
Informational duties of credit providers and mistake
Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Dlamini 2013 1 SA 219 (KZD) : regspraakAuthor Minette NortjeSource: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 2014, pp 212 –222 (2014)More Less
The informational duties of credit providers in relation to "plain language" and the form of credit agreements came under the spotlight in the recent decision of Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Dlamini 2013 1 SA 219 (KZD). The case concerned the sale of a second-hand vehicle on credit by S bank (the bank) to D (the buyer) through the agency of a car dealership. The buyer was an unsophisticated previously disadvantaged African male who had only completed schooling up to grade 3. Having discovered serious defects in the car, the buyer returned the car to the dealership four days after concluding the agreement and demanded a return of his deposit. However (possibly because the buyer failed to appreciate that the bank was his contractual partner, and not the dealership), the buyer never communicated either the return or the reasons for it to the bank. With no payments forthcoming from the buyer, the bank took steps to trace and repossess the vehicle at the dealership. Still ignorant as to the reasons for the return, the bank instituted a claim against the buyer for confirmation that the agreement had been terminated and for the costs of repossessing the vehicle. The core issue for decision was the nature and effect of the return.
Source: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 2014, pp 223 –225 (2014)More Less
The Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 (CPA) that came into operation on 31 March 2011 introduced strict liability on producers, importers, distributors and retailers for damage occasioned by defective goods. The authors of this first South African textbook dealing with this intriguing field of law set themselves the goal of explaining "some" of the theoretical problems besetting strict liability for products on the basis of an analysis of both local and foreign sources and of providing guidance in respect of practical problems created by the application of the act (v). It would therefore appear that the work is not intended as an exhaustive treatise on consumer protection law in South Africa, but rather as a pioneering attempt to highlight some topics within this broad applied field of law which spans fields such as the law of delict and contract where no more than cursory reflections on products liability as such, or as a subdivision of consumer protection, appear in the standard textbooks on these branches of the law, or in works of a more general kind (see eg Neethling and Potgieter Neethling-Potgieter-Visser The Law of Delict (2010) 317-320; 373-375; Loubser, Midgley et al The Law of Delict in South Africa (2010) 243-251; Hutchison, Pretorius et al The Law of Contract in South Africa (2012) 431 et seq; Du Bois et al Wille's Principles of South African Law (2007) 1104-1105).