1887

n Journal for Juridical Science - Die erkenning van objektiewe faktore by die verweer van provokasie in die strafreg

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Abstract

Daar bestaan tans nie volkome sekerheid oor wat die uitwerking van provokasie op aanspreeklikheid is indien 'n beskuldigde van moord aangekla word nie. Veral in die geval waar die provokasie baie sterk is, soos waar X afkom op 'n toneel waar Y besig is om met sy (X se) vrou owerspel te pleeg en X Y dan dood, is dit onseker of 'n Suid-Afrikaanse hof die misdaad van moord na strafbare manslag kan verminder. Daar word betoog dat die Suid-Afrikaanse reg behoort terug te keer na die reëls wat die howe voor omstreeks 1971 gevolg het. Regsbeleid vereis dat X nie heeltemal onskuldig bevind behoort te word nie. Dit vereis egter ook dat X nie aan moord nie, maar slegs aan strafbare manslag skuldig bevind behoort te word, indien aan die vereistes gestel vir die verweer voldoen word. Hierdie kompromie-gevolg kan slegs bereik word indien provokasie as 'n spesiale leerstuk behandel word, dit wil sê een wat nie suiwer deur gebruikmaking van die algemene beginsels van aanspreeklikheid beoordeel word nie. Dit moet as 'n spesiale leerstuk hanteer word, omdat 'n hof nie slegs 'n subjektiewe toets moet toepas om X se skuld te bepaal nie, maar ook, weens die noodsaaklikheid van die erkenning van regsbeleid, 'n objektiewe toets.


There is at present a measure of uncertainty as to what the precise effect of provocation is on liability in cases where a person is accused of murder. It is uncertain whether a South African court can reduce the crime from murder to culpable homicide, especially if the provocation is strong, as where X discovers Y in the act of committing adultery with his (X's) wife and then kills Y. In this article it is argued that South African courts ought to return to the rules relating to provocation which they followed before roughly 1971. Policy considerations require that X should not be completely acquitted. However, these considerations also require that X should not be convicted of murder, but of culpable homicide, assuming that all the requirements of the defence are complied with. One can, however, only reach this compromise solution (a conviction of culpable homicide) if provocation is treated as a special defence, that is, one which is not adjudicated strictly in terms of the general principles relating to culpability (mens rea). It must be treated as a special defence with rules of its own, because a court must not only apply a subjective test to determine X's culpability, but also an objective test, in order to satisfy policy considerations.

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/content/juridic/31/2/EJC55573
2006-12-01
2016-12-03
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