1887

n Koers : Bulletin for Christian Scholarship = Koers : Bulletin vir Christelike Wetenskap - An epistemology of engagement : research article

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Abstract

Within the viewpoint of representationalist epistemology it is assumed that objects can be represented in the mind or in language by rebuilding images of these objects from foundational ideas. In this article I examine the resistance to this depiction in an ongoing debate between Rorty and Taylor. Taylor argues that we should overcome the disengagement in what he sees as representationalism's dualism of two mutually exclusive assumptions. The first assumption is the solipsist notion that our ideas can be formed without reference to the world outside the mind. According to the second tenet, however, it is paradoxically also assumed that these inner ideas are representations of the world. Because Rorty mainly targets the element of foundationalism in representationalism, he seems to argue that all we are able to know are our perspectives. I argue (in line with Taylor's line of thought) that this view implies that Rorty leans towards solipsism and thus remains under the spell of representationalism. Taylor, on the other hand, partially accepts the strong grip of perspectives on our knowing but simultaneously devises the concept of "pre-understanding" to get beyond perspectivism. I argue that Taylor's thinking may still leave us with a mild foundationalism. However, the holism he assumes, can be used in a re-formed way to bring us a step closer to overcoming the representationalist dualism, and to steer us in the direction of an epistemology of engagement.


Binne die raamwerk van die representasionalistiese epistemologie word veronderstel dat objekte in denke of in taal weergegee kan word deur beelde van hierdie objekte vanuit "fondamentele" idees te herbou. In hierdie artikel word die weerstand teen hierdie voorstelling ondersoek in die voortgaande debat tussen Rorty en Taylor. Taylor betoog dat ons nie-gebondenheid moet oorkom in wat hy beskou as die representasionalisme se dualisme van twee wedersyds uitsluitende veronderstellings. Die eerste veronderstelling is die solipsistiese idee dat ons idees gevorm kan word sonder enige verwysing na die wêreld buite die denke. Maar, volgens die tweede veronderstelling, kan ook paradoksaal veronderstel word dat hierdie innerlike idees representasies is van die wêreld. Omdat Rorty se teiken hoofsaaklik die element van "fondamentalisme" in representasionalisme is, lyk dit of hy betoog dat al wat ons in staat is om te ken ons perspektiewe is. Ek beredeneer (in ooreenstemming met die denklyn van Taylor) dat hierdie sienswyse impliseer dat Rorty neig na 'n solipsisme en dat hy dus steeds onder die invloed van die representasionalisme verkeer. Taylor, aan die ander kant, erken gedeeltelik die greep wat perspektiewe op ons kenne het, maar ontwikkel terselfdertyd die konsep "voorverstaan" om perspektiwisme te ontkom. Ek beredeneer die stelling dat Taylor se denkwyse ons steeds met 'n matige fondamentalisme laat. Die holisme wat hy veronderstel, kan egter op 'n hervormde manier gebruik word om ons 'n tree nader te bring aan die oorkom van 'n representasionalistiese dualisme en kan ons dus in die rigting van 'n epistemologie van verbondenheid stuur.

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/content/koers/71/1/EJC59241
2006-01-01
2016-12-08
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