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- Volume 42, Issue 2, 2014
Scientia Militaria : South African Journal of Military Studies - Volume 42, Issue 2, 2014
Volume 42, Issue 2, 2014
Source: Scientia Militaria : South African Journal of Military Studies 42, pp i –vi (2014)More Less
This issue of Scientia Militaria brings an interesting mix of articles and book reviews that deal with the spectrum of defence, strategy, human security matters, civil-military relations, conflict and conflict resolution, peacekeeping and the history of war. Also included are articles from the natural sciences and an exploration of moments in South Africa's history of conflict. Geography and war, battle space and nature also receive attention. In short, we carry contributions from the social sciences, geography, military history and the natural sciences, which all demonstrate Scientia Militaria's commitment to multi- and interdisciplinary approaches.
Source: Scientia Militaria : South African Journal of Military Studies 42, pp 1 –26 (2014) http://dx.doi.org/10.5787/42-2-1092More Less
By 2013, sufficient evidence had become publicly available to confirm what defence analysts had been suspecting for a while now: the military effectiveness of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) is deficient. This article proposes that this condition is due to strategic failure, brought about by the dynamic interaction between the preferred strategic management model of the organisation and its acquired strategic culture(s). The study on which this article reports, further suggests that a design school strategic management model best explains the method towards the SANDF's current condition of organisational entropy, but that its root cause actually lies in a dichotomous strategic culture. In combination, these two variables conspired to diminish the defence force's responsiveness to its operational context, resulting in the formation of inappropriate strategy that prevented the SANDF from achieving military effectiveness. While the authors consider the article to be hypothesis generating, it also has an exploratory dimension and paves the way for a validational study at a later stage. Part 1 therefore argues towards a strategic management model that could explain the SANDF's strategy formulation process, its method of ensuring that strategic outcomes correlate with strategic intent, and ultimately its weakness in accounting for the external environment in realised strategy. This first part mainly employs inductive reasoning and draws its conclusions from an eclectic literary review that included business studies and dynamic systems theory.
Source: Scientia Militaria : South African Journal of Military Studies 42, pp 27 –53 (2014) http://dx.doi.org/10.5787/42-2-1093More Less
The analysis reported here focused on the dynamic interaction between a preferred strategic management model of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) on the one hand, and the SANDF's acquired strategic culture on the other. From a theoretical perspective, the analysis draws attention to the fact that the properties of institutional culture inform the extent to which an organisation (such as the SANDF) suffers the deleterious consequences of an inappropriate management model. The article therefore argues that the military's lack of consensus on an appropriate political culture, the lack of a suitable social culture and the lack of an effective military culture have resulted in maintaining the continued viability of two discrete, concurrent strategic cultural paradigms in the SANDF: that of the defunct SADF (initially dominant), and that of the obsolete MK (currently governing). The uneasy co-existence of these two paradigms, each with its own worldview and value system, has confounded the efforts of the SANDF to form an appropriate intended strategy and to realise military effectiveness in its execution. A dichotomous strategic culture has, in effect, reinforced the weaknesses of the SANDF's strategic management model, impeded organisational responsiveness, maximised organisational entropy, and encouraged the defence force's systemic decline - the latter, a fact that the Defence Review 2014 specifically acknowledges in the discussion of the review's first milestone. This part mainly employs deductive reasoning and draws its conclusions from a focused literary review.
"The war took its origins in a mistake" : the third war of dispossession and resistance in the Cape of Good Hope Colony, 1799-1803Author Denver WebbSource: Scientia Militaria : South African Journal of Military Studies 42, pp 54 –83 (2014) http://dx.doi.org/10.5787/42-2-1093More Less
The early colonial wars on the Cape Colony's eastern borderlands and western Xhosaland, such as the 1799-1803 war, have not received as much attention from military historians as the later wars. This is unexpected since this lengthy conflict was the first time the British army fought indigenous people in southern Africa. This article revisits the 1799-1803 war, examines the surprisingly fluid and convoluted alignments of participants on either side, and analyses how the British became embroiled in a conflict for which they were unprepared and for which they had little appetite. It explores the micro narrative of why the British shifted from military action against rebellious Boers to fighting the Khoikhoi and Xhosa. It argues that in 1799, the British stumbled into war through a miscalculation - a mistake which was to have far-reaching consequences on the Cape's eastern frontier and in western Xhosaland for over a century.
Author Gerhard J.J. OosthuizenSource: Scientia Militaria : South African Journal of Military Studies 42, pp 84 –116 (2014) http://dx.doi.org/10.5787/42-2-1095More Less
The South African Defence Force (SADF) supported UNITA during Operation Modular (June to December 1987) to stop an extensive FAPLA offensive, known as Operation Saludando a Octubre ('Salute October'). FAPLA and its Cuban-Russian allies intended to eliminate the 'UNITA problem' once and for all, and they set the conquest of Mavinga and Jamba as their first target. The SADF-UNITA alliance was, however, able to stop this advance during the Battle of the Lomba River (3 October 1987) successfully, and thereby achieved the first objective of Operation Modular. The remaining phases of Operation Modular (October to December 1987) were unsuccessfully aimed at the primary objective, namely to destroy the FAPLA brigades east of the Cuito River, or at least to force them west, across the Cuito River. The SADF-UNITA allies therefore agreed to continue military operations in the Sixth Military Region in an attempt to achieve this goal. After Operation Modular had formally come to an end early in December 1987, the planning of follow-up Operation Hooper was continued in all earnest. This article focuses on the claim of General Jannie Geldenhuys, head of the SADF (1985-1990), that Operation Hooper was an unqualified success and also on his controversial claim that Operation Hooper entered its last phase with successful attacks by the UNITA-SADF forces on 13 January, and 14 and 25 February 1988. Only the offensive/battle of 14 February 1988 was a success, however, and the SADF-UNITA alliance was unable to destroy the FAPLA brigades east of the Cuito River or to force them across the river at least. Thus, once again, not all the objectives pursued after Operation Modular could be achieved. Within a period of approximately two weeks, two unsuccessful attacks were launched against Tumpo - each time from the same direction or line of approach. The FAPLA forces were very well entrenched and equipped, and they furthermore dominated the air. In contrast, factors such as inadequate intelligence (particularly regarding the second minefield and the death acres), insufficient military equipment and manpower, inadequate logistics operations and the almost impassable sandy and bushy terrain hampered the SADF-UNITA attacks.
Source: Scientia Militaria : South African Journal of Military Studies 42, pp 117 –142 (2014) http://dx.doi.org/10.5787/42-2-1096More Less
The influence of terrain on military operations is a well-known and well-researched topic. In a South African context, the body of literature about this topic is, however, not as well developed. This article strives to make a contribution to literature about South African battles and the influence of terrain on the outcome of such battles. During the Anglo Boer War (1899-1902), two important battles were fought along the Modder River. The first of these battles is known as the Battle of Modder River or Twee Riviere (Two Rivers, if directly translated from Afrikaans), while the other is known as the Battle of Paardeberg. These battles were fought in close proximity to one another, both in distance and time. The terrain of the battlefields played a key role in both engagements. This article suggests that the spatial arrangement of the koppies (hills) and the fact that they were much closer to the Boer laager at Paardeberg than at the battle of Modder River played a key role in Cronje's surrender to the British.
The environmental management system of the South African National Defence Force at the Grahamstown Military InstallationAuthor Bheki MagagulaSource: Scientia Militaria : South African Journal of Military Studies 42, pp 143 –163 (2014) http://dx.doi.org/10.5787/42-2-1097More Less
This article presents preliminary findings on current environmental management practices used by the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) at the Grahamstown Military Installation (GMI). These findings comprise interviews with SANDF officials and an analysis of official documents, which include the first and second editions of the Environmental Management Plan for Defence (2001 & 2008 respectively). The study on which this article reports, found that the emphasis placed on environmental protection within defence force activities worldwide has compelled the South African Department of Defence and Military Veterans (SA DODMV) to regulate the management of the environment within its properties. Yet, these efforts have faced numerous challenges that range from financial to human resources deficiencies. Consequently, the military installation at Grahamstown does not have environmentally knowledgeable and qualified personnel to deal with environmental issues. From the analysis of official documents as well as interviews with respondents, it was established that the SA DODMV itself does not have a budget for environmental services. The combination of all these drawbacks has led to the failure of the implementation of the Environmental Management System (EMS) for Defence at this military installation (i.e. GMI) of the SANDF. Undoubtedly, all these challenges have severely compromised the commitment of the SA DODMV to honour its environmental management obligations. Moreover, the deficiencies of all these resources undermine the sustainable utilisation of these national assets (natural resources) entrusted to the defence force. The study reported here proposes an ideal model for the successful implementation of the EMS in SANDF military installations.
Author Jacques BezuidenhoutSource: Scientia Militaria : South African Journal of Military Studies 42, pp 164 –176 (2014) http://dx.doi.org/10.5787/42-2-1098More Less
The West Coast of South Africa between St Helena Bay to the north and Langebaan Lagoon to the south is characterised by numerous granite protrusions. These outcrops are elements of the underlying Cape Granite Suite, which forms the bedrock of a large part of the Western Cape. Granite contains high levels of natural radionuclides, which results in high levels of natural background radiation in the surrounding area. The impacts of these high levels of radiation exposure on military personal are of concern. There are four military units located in this part of the West Coast, namely SAS Saldanha, 4 Special Forces Regiment, Langebaan Road Air Force Base and the Military Academy. Different sites in and around these military units were selected and soil samples were taken. Laboratory gamma ray measurements were done to determine the levels of natural radioactive nuclides in the soil samples. The radioactive nuclide concentrations were interpolated and then mapped with the help of geographic information systems (also known as geospatial information systems or GIS) software. An evaluation of the annual dose rate of military personnel at the units on the West Coast was made and found to range between 0,017 mSv/y and 0,163 mSv/y. These values were mapped and compared to the average global annual dose rate of 0,070 mSv/y. This article reports on an investigation of these results and the overall exposure levels of personnel from the various military units on the West Coast of South Africa.
Author Deane-Peter BakerSource: Scientia Militaria : South African Journal of Military Studies 42, pp 177 –187 (2014) http://dx.doi.org/10.5787/42-2-1099More Less
In this article, I propose the creation of what I will here call the Joint Ethics Development Initiative (JEDI). The title is, of course, offered partially in jest, but the image of the Jedi warrior of the Star Wars saga is intentional. At the heart of the proposed initiative is the development of a new, rigorous and highly demanding qualification and associated training programme. Graduates ('JEDI warriors') will have demonstrated excellence in a range of capabilities necessary for success in today's complex operational environments, but most centrally they will have demonstrated excellence of character and the capability to make clear, sound and well-reasoned ethical judgments under highly challenging conditions. The proposed qualification should be viewed as playing a similar role as that played by the US Army's Ranger qualification. It would indicate a special degree of competence and mark the bearer as someone to whom peers, superiors and subordinates can reliably turn for guidance in that area of competence. Just as the Ranger programme allows for the embedding of excellence in small unit leadership and tactics in units across the Army, the JEDI programme would allow for the embedding of excellence in ethical awareness and judgment across the Joint Force.
Author Ian LiebenbergSource: Scientia Militaria : South African Journal of Military Studies 42, pp 188 –194 (2014) http://dx.doi.org/10.5787/42-2-1100More Less
The tank is viewed as the concrete manifestation of speed, mobility, all-round protection and firepower on the modern battlefield. Since its first operational deployment, it has received detailed and in-depth attention in terms of design, armament and upgrades, as well as strategy and tactics, including the evolution of armour strategy, doctrine and tactics on the battlefield. The tank redesigned battle space and has become a permanent fixture of conventional warfare over the past century.
War and Peace in Africa: Philosophy, Theology and the Politics of Confrontation, David W. Lutz (Ed.) : book reviewAuthor Mark BlaineSource: Scientia Militaria : South African Journal of Military Studies 42, pp 195 –199 (2014) http://dx.doi.org/10.5787/42-2-1101More Less
The end of the Cold War did not result in the long awaited, lasting peace - it instead unleashed several old and new conflicts with many attempts at policing with economic, institutional, moral and legal means. The reality of current conflict hot spots in the world is stark: civil wars, wars against rebel groups and Islamists, popular uprisings, coups d'état and wars against narcotic groups. The subject of this book is very topical in current security studies on the African continent as it shies away from the contemporary model, instead focusing the attention on philosophy, theology and the politics of confrontation.
Author C.N. WolfSource: Scientia Militaria : South African Journal of Military Studies 42, pp 200 –204 (2014) http://dx.doi.org/10.5787/42-2-1102More Less
Almost forty years after the end of the Cold War (CW), many developing countries have witnessed a decrease in the number of armed conflicts. However, Africa has earned a reputation of being the world's bloodiest continent, with different kinds of wars ripping the continent apart. Scholars, think-tanks and policy makers are still trying to understand the wars and conflict in Africa. Williams goes straight to the fundamental questions that continue to keep militants and strategists busy, namely how many conflicts has Africa suffered, what are the causes of conflict, why has conflict in Africa increased when other developing countries undergo peaceful developmental times, and what have governments done in response to these conflicts? Paul Williams, in his book titled War and conflict in Africa, addresses these questions.