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n Tydskrif vir Geesteswetenskappe - Die moontlikheidsvoorwaardes van metafoorgebruik - : navorsings- en oorsigartikel

Volume 52, Issue 4
  • ISSN : 0041-4751

Abstract

'n Ondersoek word ingestel na bepaalde kondisies wat die aard van metafoorgebruik onderlê en eers moontlik maak. Dit blyk dat die onderskeiding tussen en taalgebruik eersgenoemde nie bo die algemeen-interpretatiewe aard van taalgebruik verhef nie, waaruit volg dat nie taalgebruik is nie. Aristoteles se bydrae verg dat gelet word op die verband tussen en wat verband hou met die verskil tussen en en na die gegewe dat 'n metafoor iets wat "sin-strydig" (άλογον) is, bevat. 'n is nie 'n metafoor nie. Die van Homeros se metaforiese gebruik van die woord word opgevolg deur te let op die hipoteties-fiktiewe kant van 'n metafoor. Die onderskeidenheid van en maak tipiese semantiese verskynsels eers moontlik. Die voortgesette bespreking belig ook die rol van die menslike inbeeldingsvermoë in metafoorgebruik en vestig ten slotte die aandag op die aard van egte analogieë - wat na vore tree wanneer twee gegewens ooreenstem in die opsig waarin hulle verskil. Ten slotte word die elf kondisies of voorwaardes waaraan in die artikel aandag geskenk is, bondig puntsgewys saamgevat.


Faced with the vast literature on the nature of metaphoricity, this article restricts its investigation to some of the prominent conditions underlying and making metaphors possible - thus pursuing a approach - where the word does not have an but rather an ontic meaning. Making a distinction between and language-use does not elevate the former above the general interpretative nature of all language-use and at the same time does not mean we have to accept the view that all language is metaphorical. A brief explanation of the etymology of the word is followed up by referring to the well-known fourfold distinction made by Aristotle. In particular, the fourth element of Aristotle's reflection on the nature of metaphor generated attention for the connection between and - terms pointing towards the difference between and and to the fact that a metaphor contains something ( or a "meaning-contradiction" - άλογον). Boyle (Black 1998:21) alludes to the "mystery" of a metaphor which is "simply that, taken as literal, a metaphorical statement appears to be perversely asserting something to be what it is plainly known not to be". An analysis of the relationship between comparison (as a ) and a in particular, highlights the nature of which, in connection with Aristotle's approach, also bears upon . Within the context of his distinction between and , Aristotle discerns an . Just like a comparison contains four elements - where the element of comparison is taken , every point of division on a continuum is also taken - as end-point of the one part and as starting-point of the other. An assessment of the nature of a comparison and a metaphor brings to light that although the former is foundational to the latter, the two cannot be equated, because the words employed in a comparison maintain their meanings without any transfer of meaning.

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/content/akgees/52/4/EJC129921
2012-12-01
2019-08-24

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