1887

oa Alternation - Anthropocentric Chauvinism

Volume 10, Issue 1
  • ISSN : 1023-1757

 

Abstract

The question of colour has been a source of great anxiety for philosophers, as most philosophers are split between two seemingly incompatible positions, both having conceptual appeal, yet neither seeming to wholly satisfy our conceptual schema. The objectivist view appeals to our belief that colours are real properties of objects (either microphysical properties (Jackson 1998) or surface spectral reflectances (Hilbert 1987) in the external world, while the subjectivist view appeals to our experience of colours (colour as red-ness, green-ness, blue-ness, etc.), arguing that as these phenomenological aspects cannot be found in the perceiver-independent world, colour must be a product of our mind.

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/content/alt/10/1/AJA10231757_741
2003-01-01
2019-08-19

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