The aim of this article is to examine the capacity of the Holy See, as one non-state entity which is acknowledged as possessing international legal personality, to conclude treaties and other international agreements of an international juridical nature. One may wonder whether there is any need to inquire into the treaty-making capacity of the Holy See once it is accepted that that entity is an international legal person, as understood in international law.
While the Geneva Conventions and Protocols set out a fairly elaborate implementation system with regard to international conflicts, one finds no equivalent system with regard to internal conflicts that are incapable of being characterised as "international conflicts". Apart from the protecting power system to implement humanitarian principles, both the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I provide additional system of inquiry, international fact-finding commissions and inquiries by United Nations bodies. They also provide for disciplinary measures and criminal prosecutions in situations where it can be indicated that "grave breaches" or war crimes have been committed by parties to the conflict. To the extent that one can say that international humanitarian law attempts to create a protective system for victims of internal disturbance and tension situations, it is via these limited and indeterminate provisions of the mini convention Common Article 3. But even then, Common Article 3 would apply when the opposing groups or dissidents resort to arms and fall in the hands of contracting party.
The theoretical underpinnings of contract law as well as the complications caused by accidents of history are probably demonstrated uniquely by the remedy of specific performance for breach of contract. Although the South African Appellate Division has now settled the law in this respect in Benson v SA Mutual Life Assurance Society, it is difficult to understand the significance of this decision without adopting an historical and comparative overview of the subject. It is the aim of this article to place it in such a perspective.
A wide variety of statutory remedies designed specifically for the conservation of the natural environment are available in current South African law, and the application and effect of these measures have been discussed in a growing corpus of literature on the topic. This article, however, will focus on the possibilities offered by current South African statutory law for the conservation of the built-up environment, including townscapes, parts of or areas and districts in towns and cities, streets, groups or ensembles of buildings, individual buildings, open spaces and all the constituent elements of the man-made environment. The relevant statutory measures are not always designed or used to promote the conservation of the built-up environment, but all of them have some potential value for that purpose, and it is in that context that they are discussed in this article.
The historical development with regard to the marital power exercised by a husband no longer subject to the legal pressure of a family group as he originally was, serves to underscore a point recently made that "material equality" does not necessarily follow upon "ideological equality". Perhaps the time has come for the legal ordering and protection of relationships within the family to be determined from a different perspective. While the right to family life is fundamental and is recognised as such by our common law, the importance of stable family life hardly needs stressing. The need for a theoretical approach to family law has been highlighted and it might be fruitful with a view to possible future legal development, to consider the concept of a consortium of familial rights. The idea of a conjugal consortium, freely used in our case law, more especially for interference with the marriage relationship in cases of adultery and enticement, has also been the subject of various legal writings in South Africa.
In this contribution the current legal developments in Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, Lesotho,South Africa, South West Africa/Namibia, Transkei, Venda, Zambia and Zimbabwe with regards to principal legislation, government notices and judicial decisions are briefly descriptionbed.
This article discusses what happens within South African law with two particular rules that have been developed. These rules are: first, if a defendant or his property is within the area of another division of the Supreme Court of the Republic, he is not treated as a peregrinus; second, if the defendant is a peregrinus - ie not an incola in the area of any division - there must ordinarily be an arrest of his person or an attachment of his property. What the position is if the peregrinus defendant has submitted to the jurisdiction of the court, particularly where the plaintiff too is a peregrinus, is unclear from the case law. It should here be pointed out that as a rule a judge feels bound to follow the earlier judgments of his court unless convinced that they were incorrectly decided, or more specifically, a single judge when confronted with a single-judge decision of his own or linked division, feels in duty bound to follow it unless satisfied that it is clearly wrong.