n Ghanaian Journal of Economics - Bioeconomics of fisheries management under common pool and territorial use rights regimes - research

Volume 6 Number 1
  • ISSN : 2309-8945


Fish stocks in developing countries typically are managed either as common pool resources by many fishing communities or by individual communities, each of which claims territorial use rights over a fraction of a management area. Due to extraction externalities, each of these two regimes results in an economically inefficient outcome relative to a situation where a social planner manages the entire fishery. We have obtained expressions for a feasible tax on cost of harvest (as opposed to ad valorem tax) that could generate first-best outcomes in static and dynamic settings. The tax rate has been computed for a communally owned fishery using data on artisanal fishing in Ghana. Furthermore, in the absence of such a tax, an expression has been developed based on the relationship between the size of the carrying capacity of the fish stock per fishing community and the number of communities involved in harvesting the stock, to determine which regime is better than the other.

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