Conflict Trends - latest Issue

The current COVID-19 pandemic-induced crisis has prompted panic buying, looting, riots, protests and violence across Africa. The spread of the virus, together with measures to contain it, will increase the risk of social unrest and violent conflict. Social impacts such as job loss, interruptions to public health programmes, loss of access to educational and other child support services, growing mental health challenges and increased gender-based violence are collectively deepening destitution in communities in Africa. If citizens become disillusioned with the measures that their government is taking to manage the pandemic and the government fails to identify and address these social and economic impacts adequately, public mass action and protests will ensue – and social cohesion and nation-building efforts in Africa will be severely undermined.

On 22 February 2020, South Sudan formed the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGoNU), which had long been provided for under Chapter 1 of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS), signed between the government and opposition political parties on 12 September 2018 in Addis Ababa. The RTGoNU, led by Salva Kiir Mayardit as the president, saw the swearing in of the leader of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movementin- Opposition (SPLM-IO), Riek Machar Teny Dhurgon, as the first vice president. Four other vice presidents were also sworn in: James Wani Igga (second vice president, from the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/SPLM), Taban Deng Gai (third vice president, from SPLM-IO), Rebeccat Nyandeng De Mabior (fourth vice president) and Hussein Abdelbagi Akol Agany (fifth vice president, from the South Sudan Opposition Alliance/SSOA). On 12 March 2020, as part of the RTGoNU, the president appointed 10 deputy ministers and 35 members of the Council of Ministers. The unity government will also comprise 550 members of parliament, 10 governors and three area administrators. The formation of the RTGoNU was finally realised 18 months after the signing of the R-ARCSS, following mediation efforts led by the Inter- Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the deputy president of South Africa, David Mabuza, as parties continued to miss deadlines agreed both in the R-ARCSS and through mediation. While South Sudan, its neighbours and the international community may be celebrating the formation of the RTGoNU as an opportunity for renewed hope and another chance to restore peace, security and stability in a country that has witnessed intermittent conflict since it seceded from Sudan in July 2011, it is equally important to have an understanding of the huge task and responsibility (as well as the accompanying challenges) ahead of the RTGoNU in finally delivering a united, peaceful and prosperous society. This is what this article presents and analyses.

The United Nations (UN) Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) is one of the three pillars that integrates the known Peacebuilding Architecture (PBA), in conjunction with the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO). The PBF was initially designed as a fund for postconflict peacebuilding and since its inception in 2005, it has taken a proactive role in financing projects and programmes aiming at peacebuilding around the world. The PBF has engaged mostly in African countries, when compared to other recipient countries. This article analyses the role played by the PBF during its first decade of functioning (2005–2015).

Language and politics are intrinsically linked. Some argue that language is founded in an exclusionary way as a means of distinguishing allies from enemies, and of grooming allies and potential allies. Similarly, others locate the origin of a language in the need to form coalitions of a critical size, representing the initial form of social and political organisations. In the same vein, in his attempt at disclosing the enigma of language embedded in the political nature of human beings, Aristotle states...

Young people constitute the biggest proportion of the African population, and are the most affected demographic group in any country’s socio-economic and political developments. By 2019, almost 60% of Africa’s population was estimated to be under the age of 25 years, making Africa the world’s youngest continent.1 According to United Nations (UN) demographic projections, the median age in Africa in 2020 is 19.8 years.2 Almost 1 million young Africans – around 13.4% of the total labour force of 15–24-yearolds – are unemployed, more than 40% of young Africans consider their current living situation to be very bad or fairly bad, and 60% of Africans (especially youth) think that their governments are doing a very bad or fairly bad job at addressing the needs of young people.3 Young people are not represented well and are marginalised and excluded from development processes in many African countries. This pushes them to participate in demonstrations as they try to change political systems that are perceived to be incompetent and responsible for the daily suffering of people. These demonstrations have challenged institutions of power, but their influence has failed to go beyond postprotest governments and development. This article provides an overview of some of the causes and achievements of youth-led demonstrations in many parts of Africa since the Arab Spring in 2010. It also highlights several lessons from the recent developments that occurred in Sudan in 2019, where protests gave rise to a coalition government with the military and a roadmap to a civilian government through elections in three years.

Many refugees in Uganda do not have the necessary identity documents to guarantee their protection, employment and so on, because most of them moved to urban cities on their own. They experience discrimination, poverty and difficulty in attaining sustainable livelihoods. Many South Sudanese and Congolese refugees have been in Uganda for years, yet still have not achieved full refugee status. Arua and the West Nile sub-region at large are in the unique position of having a number of tribes that share common heritage and ancestry across the borders of Uganda, South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Most of the South Sudanese from Yei, Morobo and Kajo-Keji in the Western Equatoria region and Congolese from the north-eastern part of Ituri province (Imgbokolo and Abia) not only share the same language, but also have relatives across the border in Uganda.

This article draws from a skills-building project carried out by the Nneola Foundation for Women and Children Development, a livelihoods and peacebuilding initiative for women in Nigeria. The organisation was founded by the author to support women in developing work-related skills that aid socio-economic development. This project was a one-year (2017–2018) skills acquisition training for women that took place in Delta State, Nigeria. The Nneola Foundation partnered with a local tailoring organisation in Delta State to teach sewing skills to five unemployed married women, who were selected from a pool of applicants based on their financial needs and interest in acquiring tailoring skills. Drawing on insights from a year-long interaction with the project coordinator, this article discusses the potential and limitations of tailoring as a peacebuilding and skills-building initiative that seeks to provide women with livelihood and community engagement opportunities. Situated within Johan Galtung’s concepts of positive peace and structural violence,1 the article further demonstrates how structural violence (inequality) can be addressed through positive peacebuilding (livelihood opportunities). This was a relatively small project, and the lessons learnt are summarised and discussed, with recommendations for those considering similar projects in the future.

Peace, Security and Post-conflict Reconstruction in the Great Lakes Region of Africa is a bilingual compilation edited by two renowned professors of political science and history of African studies respectively. For decades, the Great Lakes region in Africa has witnessed wars and conflicts – most notably, genocide in Rwanda in 1994; liberation wars and conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), ending in 1997 and 2001 respectively; and post-electoral violence in the Central African Republic in 2016 (p. 1).