Conflict Trends - latest Issue

Investing in conflict prevention will continue to be Africa’s major challenge in the next decade. The fall of the Berlin Wall brought an end to an era of one-party states and authoritarian rule in many parts of the world and ushered in a new era of multi-party democracy. Africa was not unaffected by these “winds of change”. Many countries in Africa saw the fall of one-party states and the introduction of multi-party democracy. This paradigm shift was welcomed across Africa and the world, and brought a new energy to governance, with respect for human rights, accountability, and human-centred development at the forefront. Positive economic growth was posted across the continent, with many calling it the era of the “African Renaissance,” and declaring that this will be the “African Century”.

The political and economic reforms introduced by Ethiopia’s new Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali since he took office in April 2018 have been the object of much coverage and debate in the media. Depending on how these changes are implemented, they could improve the country’s socio-economic conditions. From a peacebuilding perspective, they also have the potential to ease tensions between certain ethnic groups.

In 2013, Zimbabweans overwhelmingly endorsed the adoption of a new constitution through a referendum held in March 2013. The constitution was hailed by many as constituting a break from the past; thus the document represented an “aspirational nation”. The ”YES Vote” campaign drew support from across the political divide. An overwhelming 94.4 % of the electorate voted in support of the new constitution while the “No Vote” campaign fronted by the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) garnered less than 5% of the national vote.1 One possible explanation for the overwhelming endorsement is that the proposed constitution touched on bi-partisan issues that the electorate saw as important in moving the country forward and breaking with the past. For example, it guaranteed freedom of speech and association, introduced presidential term limits and also proposed mechanisms to increase and enhance the visibility of women in national politics.

“Going, going, gone!” is a refrain commonly used to herald the determination of the highest bidder of an item being sold on auction. This process of presenting items for bid, taking bids, and then selling them to the highest bidder aptly encapsulates a questionable practice that has permeated Nigeria’s recent electoral experience: vote buying. Vote buying is not fundamentally new to Nigeria’s electoral politics or only restricted to Nigeria or Africa. According to Matenga, however, “nearly 80% of voters from 36 African countries believe voters are bribed – either sometimes, often or always. Furthermore, 16% of voters in African countries reported being offered money or goods in exchange for their vote during the last election”.

Policy makers and scholarship on peacebuilding increasingly focus on reconciliation. In fact, peacebuilding efforts after violent experiences are usually accompanied by powerful calls to go the reconciliation route. Reconciliation is the mutual acceptance of the other in a peaceful relationship and the sustainability of that acceptance; accompanied by a commitment to bind relationships in accord with future interests rather than being stuck in a conflicted past. Yet reconciliation remains a profound challenge in societies that experience political violence. Zimbabwe is facing a similar situation despite a series of state-centred efforts at reconciliation. From the 1980 Policy of National Reconciliation to the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission (NPRC), a constant pattern of inefficacy is observed.

Since the return to democracy in 1999, Nigeria has been grappling with diverse security challenges, chief among them are insurgency, election violence, kidnapping and most recently, the herder-farmer conflicts among others. The north central states of Benue, Plateau and Nasarawa and other states have experienced conflicts that led to thousands of deaths and displacements as a result of clashes between pastoralists (herders) and local farmers in several communities. In January 2018 alone, Amnesty International reports indicate that 168 people were killed as a result of herdsmen-farmer clashes.

A rather surprising and astonishing ruling was taken on 8 June 2018 at The Hague by the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the case of The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo. The Appeals Chamber reversed the decision of the Trial Chamber III of 21 March 2016, entitled “Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”. The Trial Chamber had in its decision found Bemba of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), as a person effectively acting as a military commander, guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity.2 These crimes were proved beyond reasonable doubt to have been committed in the Central African Republic (CAR) from on or about 26 October 2002 to 15 March 2003 when Bemba as president of the Mouvement de libération du Congo (MLC), a political party founded by him, and Commander-in-Chief of its military branch, the Armée de libération du Congo (ALC), sent its troops to rescue President Ange Felix Patassé whose power in the CAR was threatened by a rebel movement led by Army General François Bozizé.