Journal of African Elections

By the late 1950s and early 1960s most African colonies had attained independence from British and French rule, resulting in great optimism regarding the future of the nascent democracies on the continent. A buoyant populace transformed their memories of harsh political struggles into images of heroism and confirmed the victory of the national movement for liberation. There was hope that these new nations would soon steer their own ships of state and conduct free, fair and regular elections that would be true reflections of the wishes of the majority of the population. Sadly, what transpired afterwards was (and still is) far from what had been expected. Civil unrest and anarchy soon reigned in most African countries as the so-called ‘founding fathers’ considered themselves above the law. In a bid to retain power, they initiated a system of electoral manipulation and violence that continues to pervade the continent. More worrisome was the birth of a culture that excluded Africa’s youth from active participation in politics; this resulted in the retention of old politicians, evident in a leadership occupied mostly by septuagenarians and octogenarians. This study examines gerontocracy in Africa and its impact on the political participation of Africa’s youth.

The study examines the extent to which Nigeria’s electoral body complied with existing legal frameworks on Internally Displaced Persons’ (IDP) voting during the 2015 general elections. The existing legal frameworks in question consist of two international frameworks which Nigeria adopted, and two domestic frameworks. The United Nations Guiding Principles on Internally Displaced Persons, and the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, otherwise known as the Kampala Convention, are the two international frameworks. The domestic legal frameworks include the 1999 Constitution (as amended) and the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended). Data for the study was generated through interviews with officials of the electoral body of Nigeria. This was complemented by documentary evidence based on secondary sources, including Nigeria’s election reports, the Electoral Act 2010, the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, and other relevant materials. Data were analysed using content analysis rooted in logical deduction. The result of the data analysis shows that the handling of the voting rights of IDPs in Nigeria’s 2015 general elections by the electoral body contravened all the existing legal frameworks that guide IDP voting. The study therefore recommends that a system of electronic voting should be introduced in Nigeria to enable all eligible Nigerians, including IDPs, to vote in whichever part of the country they are resident at the time of the election.

Recently, questions have emerged concerning the professionalism and impartiality of election observers. In Kenya, concerns arose after the August 2017 elections when the Supreme Court of Kenya nullified Uhuru Kenyatta’s victory, despite observers suggesting that the elections were credible. Proceeding from this foundation, this paper examines the conduct of election observers in the elections and the claim that their behaviour was equivalent to being impartial. The data that informed the study was collected through interviews and analysis of previous research. The findings of this research demonstrate that election observation cannot be detached from the social, political and security context in which it takes place and the methodologies used by observers also influence their findings. Importantly, the technological expertise of observer missions is becoming increasingly important as states turn to more sophisticated electoral technology. In addition, the study reveals that elections have become a polarising factor in Kenya due to the rise of ethnic politics and prevalence of dysfunctional institutions. The bitter power struggles that unfold during elections have tended to implicate international observers as each political contender expects observers to support their position. We conclude that allegations of impartiality levelled against the observers are intended to serve the political goals of those who raise them. Our findings suggest three circumstances under which observers may be accused of bias. The first is when politicians feel that the odds are stacked against their chances of clinching victory in elections. Secondly, accusations of bias may be advanced as a campaign tool to whip up public sympathy or consolidate support. Thirdly, claims of bias may be used by the opposition to justify post-election protests intended to force a repeat poll or extract a political deal to cater for its interests.