1887

n Journal for Juridical Science - Institutional independence and the constitutionality of legislation establishing lower courts and tribunals : part I

Volume 28, Issue 2
  • ISSN : 0258-252X
USD

 

Abstract

The independence of the judiciary is the bedrock of the democratic system of government. Judicial independence is the gateway to the proper performance of the courts of their role of keeping all organs of state within the boundaries of their powers under the Constitution. The test for determining whether judicial independence is safeguarded is an objective one based on public confidence in the structure of the court and the impartiality of its judicial officers. The ascertainment of the independence of a tribunal depends on the mode of appointment of its judges, their financial security and whether their security of tenure is institutionally safeguarded from legislative or executive manipulation. This article lays down the constitutional basis for judicial independence; examines the test for ascertaining whether a court is independent and impartial; and links judicial independence with separation of powers. The discussion culminates in the analysis of the application of the principles of judicial independence to specific legislative schemes where the structure of the tribunal thereby established had been tested in the courts for unconstitutionality.

<b>Institusionele onafhanklikheid en die grondwetlikheid van wetgewing vir die skepping van laer howe en tribunale : deel I</b> <br>Die onafhanklikheid van die regbank is die grondslag van 'n demokratiese regeringstelsel. 'n Onafhanklike regbank is die toegangspunt vir die behoorlike funksionering van die howe en 'n voorwaarde vir hulle rol om alle staatorgane binne die grense van hul verleende bevoegdhede ingevolge die grondwet te hou. Die toets om te bepaal of regterlike onafhanklikheid gewaarborg word is 'n objektiewe een gebasseer op openbare vertroue in die struktuur van die howe en die onpartydigheid van voorsittende beamptes. Die vasstelling van die onafhanklikheid van 'n tribunaal hang af van die wyse van aanstelling van regsprekende beamptes, hulle finansiële sekuriteit en of hul sekerheid van ampsbekleding institusioneel gewaarborg is teenoor wetgewende en uitvoerende manipulasie. Hierdie artikel bespreek die konstitusionele basis vir regtelike onafhanklikheid; dit ondersoek die toets om vas te stel of 'n hof onafhanklik en onpartydig is; en verbind regterlike onafhanklikheid met skeiding van magte. Die beginsels van regterlike onafhanklikheid word toegepas op spesifieke wetgewende programme waar die ongrondwetlikheid van die struktuur van die tribunaal wat daardeur totstand gebring is in die howe getoets is.

Loading full text...

Full text loading...

Loading

Article metrics loading...

/content/juridic/28/2/EJC55506
2003-12-01
2016-12-10

This is a required field
Please enter a valid email address
Approval was a Success
Invalid data
An Error Occurred
Approval was partially successful, following selected items could not be processed due to error