Some reflections on the post-colonial state in Portuguese-speaking Africa

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In this article I want to raise two distinct but interrelated questions, questions which I believe lie at the heart of the analysis of the contemporary politics of Portuguese-speaking Africa. First, what is the analytical relationship between understanding the post-colonial African state and understanding post-colonial politics in Africa? Second, how historically different is the post-colonial state in Portuguese-speaking Africa from the post-colonial African state generally?

This article is divided in four parts. In the first two sections I reflect on why the history of Portuguese Africa and of Portuguese decolonization has so often been confined to a discussion of its Lusophone specificate. In the third part, I reconsider the question of how best to study the state in post-colonial Portuguese-speaking Africa. The last section is a more general argument in favour of the reinterpretation of post-colonial politics in Africa.

The history of Portuguese Africa

For reasons having largely to do with the history of Portugal in Africa, Africanists have tended to view Portuguese-speaking Africa differently from the rest of the continent. This has had serious consequences for the study of Lusophone Africa, consequences which, in my view, have had a profound effect on the interpretation of the post-colonial state in Portuguese-speaking Africa.

The reasons that have led historians to focus on the singularity of Portuguese-speaking Africa come under three broad headings. The first has to do with the history of Portugal itself; the second with the history of Portuguese colonial rule; and the third with the history of Portuguese decolonization.

Ever since the mid-nineteenth century, and certainly from the time of the Berlin Conference, the Portuguese have considered both that their “mission” in Africa was different from that of the other imperial powers and that the rest of Europe failed to understand how different that “mission” was. From the Portuguese viewpoint, this severe misunderstanding is perhaps best symbolized in the early years of colonial rule by the 1890 British Ultimatum and in the later years by the UN’s refusal to admit Portugal because of its stance on its “overseas provinces”.

From the perspective of the other European powers, this sense of Portuguese differences is revealed in, for example, the history of the “scandals” of forced labour in Lusophone Africa and a widespread perception that the Portuguese colonial administration was utterly deficient. Finally, both the Portuguese and their European rivals considered (from opposite moral perspectives) that the scale of miscegenation in Portuguese Africa was a symbol of the differences between the nature of their colonial rule.

Of course, the history of Portugal since the nineteenth century, but particularly since the end of the Republic in 1926, provides good reasons for viewing the Portuguese colonial rule differently. Portugal’s economic backwardness, its reliance on mercantilism, its extremely slow industrial development, etc, all made it inevitable that Portugal would have neither the inclination nor the resources to “exploit” its African empire like the other colonial powers. Portugal, which dated its presence in Africa to the fifteenth century, could never accept that the criteria for “effective” colonial occupation agreed at the Berlin Conference could in and of themselves reflect the realities of the Portuguese presence in Africa.
AfricA. Conversely, Portugal's colonial rivals viewed the Portuguese claim of its "special" relationship with Africa as a smokescreen for excessive colonial ambitions and deficient colonial achievements.

While during the Republican era (1910–1926), Portugal had sought to manage its colonial empire broadly on the lines followed by the other colonial powers, from 1926 it isolated itself from the rest of the world and devised a colonial policy strictly in keeping with the Estado Novo's narrow vision of its imperial mission. After World War II and especially after the beginning of African decolonization (from the mid-1950s onwards), Salazar's colonial policies seemed to set the course of Portuguese Africa completely at odds with the rest of the continent. Not surprisingly, therefore, the history of Portuguese Africa since the 1920s has often been distinct from that of the rest of colonial Africa.

But, perhaps the apparent singularity of Portuguese Africa was made most manifest in the years of decolonization. If from the 1950s, Britain and France (although not yet Belgium and Spain) were preparing for the transfer of power to their African subjects, Portugal deemed its African colonies to be and forever to remain overseas "provinces", integral parts of the motherland. This policy, dictated by the views of an ageing tyrant, was swayed neither by the French experience in Algeria nor by that of the Belgians in the Congo. It took over a decade of colonial war, the collapse of the dictatorship and the return to democracy in Lisbon, before Portuguese Africa was set free. Here again, this singularly violent process of decolonization marked out the Portuguese colonies from the rest of Africa.

Furthermore, the intellectual and repressive climate of the Estado Novo made the development of any serious Portuguese history of (both metropolitan and overseas) Portugal impossible. It also made it impossible for non-Portuguese scholars to have access to the kind of historical sources which they were able to use for the study of the British and French empires. Not only was it difficult for historians to study Portuguese Africa per se, but the absence of any reasonable history of metropolitan Portugal meant that those who wanted to understand Lusophone Africa had first to write such a history themselves.

As a result, historians of Portuguese Africa tended to be Lusophone specialists, perforce more inclined to concentrate on the singularities of their area of study than of comparing Portuguese Africa with the rest of colonial Africa. Furthermore, few historians of colonial (British, French or Belgian) Africa had any serious knowledge of Portuguese Africa, thus reducing even further the probability of comparative colonial history. Add to this the fact that colonial history generally focused more on the history of the colonial power in Africa than on the history of Africans under colonial rule and it becomes clear why our knowledge of Portuguese "Africa" has been severely curtailed.

Whatever their training, approach or ideological perspective, analysts of the five African Lusophone countries have had largely to rely on the histories of colonial Portuguese Africa extant. They too have felt the need to re-examine the history of Portugal in order to assess the relevance of Portuguese colonial history for the analysis of post-colonial Portuguese-speaking Africa. They too, therefore, have been inclined to view these countries from the perspective of their differences from the rest of independent Africa.

My argument here is not that Portuguese Africa was not in many ways singular nor that a study of these singularities is not important. It is rather that the focus on these singularities has often been at the expense of the understanding of the realities of the post-colonial Portuguese African experience. Before I develop this argument further, however, I want to touch briefly on why the analysis of Portuguese decolonization has tended further to remove the study of Lusophone Africa away from a comparative African perspective.

The study of the decolonization of Portuguese Africa

There are a number of historical and conceptual reasons why Portuguese decolonization has tended to be viewed through particularistic eyes. The first, and perhaps most important, is that it took place a good 15 years after French and British decolonization. By then, Africans and Africanists alike had a different perception of the realities of African independences. Portuguese decolonization took place against the background of an attempt to understand the growing problems of post-colonial Africa. This influenced the analysis of Portuguese decolonization as well as the expectations of what post-colonial Lusophone Africa might or might not be like.

Second, decolonization was achieved by means of a struggle of national liberation – taking the form of a guerrilla war in three of the five Portuguese colonies. Although there had been in Algeria one precedent for such a nationalist war and although there had been in black Africa instances of nationalist violence (eg, Cameroon, Kenya, Congo), the Lusophone experience of armed struggle was essentially new. As such it called forth a different analysis of the process of decolonization. It thus attracted the attention of a number of observers with greater interest in the process of the armed struggle than in African history.

Third, the decolonization of the Portuguese territories went hand in hand with the nationalists' apparently unanimous commitment to post-colonial "socialism". Indeed, the five Lusophone regimes set about establishing what they considered to be a "socialist" state immediately after independence. This policy of "transition to socialism" took place against the background of an Africa where the first wave of "socialist" experiments was recognized to have failed. It also occurred at a time when socialism world wide was entering a crisis which, we now know, it was not to survive. Because of this, and because Portuguese-speaking Africa had achieved independence through "people's wars", it was seen as the last great hope of "socialism". As such, its post-colonial development attracted the attention of some analysts more interested in the fate of socialism than in that of Africa.

Finally, the decolonization of Portuguese Africa came intimately to be linked with the demise of the dictatorship in metropolitan Portugal. Quite clearly, the impetus for, and the
political orientation of, the coup which eventually toppled the Salazar-Caetano regime owed much to the involvement of the military in the African nationalist wars. Hence, the history of Portugal’s march to democracy is inextricably connected with that of the decolonization of its African empire. As a result, Portuguese decolonization has attracted attention from historians more interested in Portuguese than African history.

For all these reasons, the history of the decolonization of the Portuguese colonies has often been written from a perspective which has less to do with Africa than with extraneous historical, political, intellectual or ideological factors. This, I think, to a much greater extent than was true of the history of the decolonization of the rest of black Africa. So here again, we see that a strong combination of historical factors has led us to look at these five countries from the premise of their singularities, rather than from their shared history as African colonies experiencing a difficult post-colonial transition.

While all the factors mentioned above are important, I want here particularly to discuss the import of the “socialist” conceptual perspective on Lusophone Africa for it seems to me to be the one analytical factor which has most influenced the analysis of its post-colonial state. The apparently socialissant effect of the nationalist wars in Angola, Guinea and Mozambique combined with the fact that all five Lusophone countries seemed to make good their intention to establish “socialism” after independence, strongly over-determined the interpretation of the complex and evolution of their post-colonial fate. Indeed, it virtually imposed an analytical approach which not only took for granted the reality of “socialism”, but assumed the feasibility of a “transition to socialism” in Portuguese-speaking Africa.

Such an approach had two constituent parts. The first considered the Portuguese-speaking countries from the perspective of those other countries (Russia, China, Vietnam, Cuba, etc) where nationalist struggle and revolution had combined to bring about a new “socialist” order. The second deduced the viability of the “transition to socialism” from the nature of the nationalist war. That is, it established an historical causation between the development of people’s wars proclaiming a “socialist” ideology in the former Portuguese colonies and the construction of a “socialist” post-colonial order.

While both approaches had powerful historical and ideological roots, they both failed to ground their respective analyses in the realities of twentieth-century colonial and post-colonial Africa. Instead of studying the process by which these people’s wars were adapted (more or less successfully) to an African setting, they read into them a necessary revolutionary causal significance. Because the nationalist wars in Portuguese Africa had, as people’s wars, strong resonances with those of China, Vietnam, etc, they were also taken to be necessarily pregnant with a “socialist” future. They were seen to presage a “transition to socialism” not just in Angola, Guinea and Mozambique, but also in Cape Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe, two countries otherwise totally different historically, socially, economically, politically and culturally.

It is true that the process of the Lusophone people’s wars was largely new to black Africa and that it did echo people’s wars elsewhere. Yet, the context within which they took place made it improbable that they would engender full-fledged (as opposed to “mere” nationalist) revolutions. As I have written elsewhere, there were no historical, structural or socioeconomic reasons to expect in black Africa (except perhaps in “feudal” Ethiopia) revolutions in the mould of the “classical” revolutions (France, Russia, China or even Vietnam). Thus, it was always highly unlikely that the Lusophone nationalist wars would bring about any “transition to socialism”, least of all on the Russian, Chinese, Vietnamese or even Cuban model.

To conclude, then, the study of Portuguese decolonization reinforced further, if for different reasons, the analysis of Portuguese-speaking Africa from the viewpoint of its specificities. The fact that, on the whole, historians of Portuguese Africa, students of the Lusophone people’s wars and analysts of the post-colonial “transition to socialism” worked within totally different perspectives, reduced the opportunities for meaningful analytical dialogue and led to excessive compartmentalization. Indeed, it is striking how little continuity there is in the study of colonial and post-colonial Lusophone Africa. It is also striking how little analytical dialogue there has been between students of Lusophone and Francophone/Anglophone Africa.

The post-colonial state in Portuguese-speaking Africa

I should now like to argue for a different approach to the study of Portuguese-speaking Africa. Instead of looking at the post-colonial Lusophone state from a Lusophone perspective, we must look at the evolution of politics in Portuguese-speaking Africa from the perspective of the evolution of politics in post-colonial Africa generally. From this viewpoint, what are the characteristics of the post-colonial state in Lusophone Africa in relation to those of the rest of Africa? Are there any grounds for thinking that the state in Portuguese-speaking Africa is in any fundamental way different from the post-colonial state elsewhere? What, finally, is the analytical relationship between understanding the post-colonial state and explaining post-colonial politics in Portuguese-speaking Africa?

If we accept that it is analytically fruitful to consider the post-colonial state in black Africa from a comparative perspective, we must find a way of linking the development of the Lusophone post-colonial experience to that of the rest of Africa. Although in the years immediately following the independence of the Portuguese colonies it seemed that they were to follow a different path, enough time has now elapsed to see that this is not so. Today, a good 15 years after Portuguese decolonization, it is clear that, whatever the colonial specificities of Lusophone Africa, the evolution of their post-colonial politics is following an identifiable pattern.

We must also begin to recognize that, despite a common colonial past, there are seriously important differences between the post-colonial history of the five Lusophone African countries – differences which are analytically significant. It is most useful to divide these countries into three groups. The first is that of Cape Verde and São Tomé and
Principe, countries which in many crucial respects are better understood as creole societies (like the Caribbean) than as African ones. The second consists of Guinea-Bissau, a small West African country, whose history is best compared to that of neighbouring societies (in Senegal, Guinea and The Gambia). There is finally Angola and Mozambique, the Southern African giants, the political evolution of which has followed somewhat parallel routes but, countries which are in fact most profitably compared with their immediate neighbours: Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe or Tanzania.

Even at this level of generality, it is immediately apparent how artificial the analysis is which consists in lumping these five Lusophone countries together. The fact that they all share a Portuguese colonial heritage and that they all marched into independence committed to some form of "socialism" is much too feeble a basis on which to generalize. But there is more, for even the colonial history of these five societies is so different as to invalidate any generalization about the similarities in the consequences of colonial rule.

Cape Verde was always apart, seen by the Portuguese as a special case and ruled accordingly. São Tomé and Principe was somewhat of a closed society, evolving as it did according to the rise and fall of its plantation economy. Guinea, always a Portuguese backwater, is best seen as the parent pauvre of the West African (French and British) colonies. Only Angola and Mozambique share many of the same features: from creole and mestizo communities to settler colonies. Even here, however, it is not difficult to show that in many fundamental ways (eg, concession companies, labour policies, presence of Indians) Mozambique is a case apart. It seems to me, therefore, that given these differences there is little point in looking too hard for commonalities in the post-colonial development of the state in the five Lusophone countries.

Furthermore, I believe there is a more fundamental historical reason why it is more profitable to study the evolution of the post-colonial state from an "African" rather than colonial perspective. Let me be clear. One of the most significant lessons we can now draw from the analysis of post-colonial African politics is the importance of the process which I call (deliberately controversially) political Africanization. By political Africanization I mean the "all important process whereby the political legacy - the ideas, practices and institutions - of colonial rule and colonization was assimilated, transformed and re-appropriated by Africa". However significant the differences between various forms of colonial rule may have been, the outcome of political Africanization is a process by which the sedimentation of post-colonial politics occurs along relatively similar lines in the various parts of Africa.

If this is so, then it follows that the nature of the colonial legacy is less important than the ways in which it is Africanized after independence. It also follows that in order to understand Africa's post-colonial politics we need to understand the nature of the links between its pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial political history. Hence, it is more important to study the evolution of post-colonial African politics from the perspective of the evolution of the African societies which form these independent countries, rather than simply from that of the post-colonial state as it was erected at independence on the foundations of (and in reaction against) the colonial state.

As time elapses, as the post-colonial period lengthens, as African societies recover their past and evolve according to continuities which link them back with their roots in the pre-colonial period, the significance of the colonial legacy is put into perspective. Over time, the process of political Africanization shapes and re-shapes the political structures established at independence according to the vagaries and rhythms of the relationship between state and society. Constitutional arrangements and ideological pronouncements are adapted to and converted by the realities of post-colonial politics and economics. As this happens, the apparent similarities between the post-colonial politics of the five Lusophone countries evaporate, revealing underneath divergences in their political evolution which are best explained in terms of their (colonial, pre-colonial and post-colonial) history.

Perhaps a couple of examples will best show what I mean. First, comparing the post-colonial state in Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, one would expect major similarities. The two countries shared the same movement of national liberation, the PAIGC, in which both Cape Verdians and Guineans nationalists struggled together. At independence, they established a bicephalous single-party state in which the two countries were closely linked politically and even economically. The two countries shared the same colonial and nationalist past and the same ideological outlook. The common party, the PAIGC, was committed to closer integration between the two countries. Yet, within a few years, the links between the two were broken, each country went its separate way. Very quickly, it became apparent that Cape Verde's (relative) success in managing its colonial inheritance and in overcoming very serious post-colonial disadvantages was not to be repeated in Guinea-Bissau. Why?

With the benefit of hindsight it is easy to say that Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau were very different, that their union was not viable and that there was very little chance that their respective post-colonial development would be similar. And yet, a narrow focus on the post-colonial state provides very little basis for explaining why the divergences were so wide. Indeed, it detracts from the analysis of the factors which most plausibly account for those political divergences. I would argue instead that understanding the evolution of state politics in Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau presupposes first an understanding of the relation between the post colonial politics of these two countries and their respective colonial and even pre-colonial history.

Second, an analysis of the political significance of Unitas and Renamo in, respectively, Angola and Mozambique from a state perspective would suggest important similarities. Both movements are "anti-socialist", "anti-mestizo", "black-oriented" and grounded in "traditional" socio-political structures. Both have used violence on a massive scale, both have contributed to the collapse of the economy of their respective countries and both have single-mindedly sought to destroy the infrastructure and the trappings of state power. Both, finally, have been
supported by South Africa, the designs of which in the Southern African region they have amply served. Yet, I would argue that an analysis along these lines would obscure rather than reveal the genesis and importance of Unita and Renamo in the post-colonial politics of Angola and Mozambique.

Today, when negotiations for peace in the two countries are about to bear fruit, it might seem obvious how different Unita and Renamo are. Yet, it is not so long ago that there was near-unanimity in the political analysis of these two movements as consisting of bandidos armados, bent on the mindless destruction of the post-colonial state. In fact, I would argue that, above and beyond the obvious similarities in some of the means employed by Unita and Renamo, these two movements have had little in common. Again, in order meaningfully to understand them it is necessary to relate the evolution of the post-colonial politics of Angola and Mozambique to their very different colonial and pre-colonial antecedents.

I cannot here discuss Unita and Renamo in any serious detail but Geoffray's *La cause des armes au Mozambique* provides what I consider to be the most convincing analysis of a movement like Renamo. It also provides one of the best examples extant of the new approach to the analysis of post-colonial politics which I advocate in *Power in Africa*. Finally, it shows concretely why an understanding of the post-colonial state in (Lusophone) Africa is best achieved by an analysis of its relationship with (civil) society. I now turn to a more general discussion of contemporary politics in Africa.

The state in post-colonial Africa

It is today not difficult to see that what has for the past 20 to 30 years passed for an analysis of African politics has largely been an analysis of the state in post-colonial Africa. There are, of course, good historical reasons why this has been so. First, decolonization was largely about the construction of a post-colonial state to take over at independence. Second, the post-colonial state replaced the colonial state, a visibly strong and interventionist state which had clearly been the paramount actor in colonial politics.

Third, the state was recognized to have been central to the construction of the modern European nation-state and the realities of independent Africa dictated that it would be the post-colonial state which would create the African nation-state. Finally, the European state after World War II was conceived to be dominant politically and economically, reinforcing the then fairly popular "socialist" notion of the command state.

If it is easy to see why Africanists were at first prone to studying state politics, it is more difficult to understand why they persisted for so long in believing that the post-colonial African state should evolve like states in other parts of the world. The post-colonial state, it is true, was usually constructed on the model of one or the other of the European states. Yet, the very divergent evolution of the various European states should have warned Africanists that the African post-colonial state was unlikely to follow any recognizable precedent. Furthermore, the causes of such divergence in Europe were such as to suggest that it was the relation between state and society, not constitutional frameworks, which determined the fate of the modern nation-state.

In retrospect it can be seen that Africanists were for too long fooled into believing that the vagaries of the African post-colonial state "explained" African politics. In this respect it is strange that students of the Portuguese-speaking African countries - which only became independent some 15 years after the French and British colonies - should so readily have repeated the mistakes of those who had examined the political fate of French- and English-speaking Africa in the early years of their independence. Strange indeed, for it was precisely in the late 1970s that the latter began to suggest other interpretations of the post-colonial African state.

I have explained elsewhere why I believe that the African post-colonial state, although overdeveloped, hegemonic and omnipresent, is in fact both soft and over-extended. Its violent and repressive nature is more properly the reflection of its political weakness than of its strength. More importantly, I have argued at some length that in order to understand the post-colonial African state it is necessary to understand the complex and multiple ways in which the post-colonial political order has been (politically) Africanized since independence. By which I mean that it is more profitable to conceptualize the African state today as an African(ized) state than to continue to view its evolution from a notional European state as deliquescent or pathological.

Echoing what I have written in *Power in Africa*, I would argue here that Africanists have hitherto largely inverted the political causalities between state and society in post-colonial Africa. The evolution of the post-colonial state is better understood as the process by which (civil) society has re-asserted control over the political order via the state rather than simply as the process by which the holders of state power have asserted their hegemonic powers.

The interpretation of the relationship between state and society in post-colonial Africa has gone through at least three phases. The first consisted in believing that the post-colonial state was all powerful and held the keys to the "development" of the new African nation-states. The second viewed the political and economic "crisis" which engulfed post-colonial Africa as the consequence of the collapse of the post-colonial state - by which was meant both its repressive excesses and dereliction in the discharge of its duties. The latest interpretation of the state's manifest failure is seen as the "revenge" of Africa's (civil) society.

This last interpretation is an important analytical advance on the other two in that it suggests that the evolution of the state can be understood only in its relation with society. The African post-colonial state has indeed been shaped and transformed in the endlessly changing process by which it has sought to assert political and economic hegemony over (civil) society. But the dichotomies between state and (civil) society and the sharpness of the political competition between the two can be, and have been, overdrawn.

I argue in *Power in Africa* that the resilience as well as the deficiencies of the post-colonial state are best explained by the
nature of the very complex links which tie, rather than simply oppose, state and (civil) society. While at the macro-analytical level it makes some sense to view state and civil society as driven by competing hegemonic drives, at the micro-level there are strong complicities between individuals within the state and civil society. That is, the clientelist, patronimial and prebendal networks which link individuals from state and (civil) society are so numerous and so extensive that they guarantee the maintenance of a political system in which the state is only paramount over, in so far as it is colonized by, (civil) society.

Once the relation between (civil) society and the state is recast in this way, it becomes easier to understand the endurance of the contemporary African state. In post-colonial Africa, then, the state is indeed at the centre of politics for it is at once the main agent in the construction and maintenance of the nation-state and the primary locus for the hegemonic drive. Nevertheless, however central and however hegemonically successful (for those who have access to its various networks) the post-colonial state may be, its power to act upon society is severely circumscribed. Because the state survives only insofar as it is colonized, appropriated, by (civil) society, its capacity to change that self-same society by means of social and economic “engineering” is extremely limited.

In post-colonial Africa, therefore, it is largely an illusion to view the state as the agent for (socialist or capitalist) economic development. While in Southeast Asia and the Far East, for instance, the modern state has indeed often been responsible for impressive rates of economic growth, in Africa the post-colonial state has been the chief instrument of (individual and collective) hegemonic drive. It has enabled the holders of state power and all those connected to them through the state’s multifarious networks to have access to the resources appropriated by and through the state. These resources have been utilized for purposes which on the whole have been detrimental to Africa’s economic growth and development: exchange, consumption or accumulation rather than investment and production. The notion that the Lusophone post-colonial state could bring about a “transition to socialism” was thus never seriously plausible.

Conclusion

If this argument is right, it follows that our understanding of the state in post-colonial Portuguese-speaking Africa is still in its infancy. We have insisted in viewing it as a specific “Lusophone” African state with similarities between the five countries which are largely figments of our imagination. We have been blinded by the notion of the putative supremacy of the powerful, voluntarist, “socialist” post-colonial state able to act upon and reform society in ways which have failed to materialize anywhere else in post-colonial Africa. We have, consequently, tended to attribute the manifest failures of the post-colonial state in Portuguese-speaking Africa to extraneous factors (eg, South Africa, IMF, drought) largely beyond state control.

We need to rethink our approach and accept that, however different the history of Portuguese-speaking Africa may have been, the trajectory of its post-colonial states is not significantly different from the trajectory of other African post-colonial states. Or rather, the differences which exist are no more (and no less) significant than the differences which may be found between any group of post-colonial African states. These differences are best explained by an historical analysis of the sedimentation of Africa’s post-colonial politics. We need, finally, to accept that a better understanding of the post-colonial state in the five Portuguese-speaking countries in Africa will depend on a sharper analysis of the relationship between these individual states and the (civil) societies with which they are so inter-linked.

Notes and references

1 In this paper I use Lusophone as a strict equivalent to Portuguese-speaking. I am, however, aware that some (Africans and Africanists) object to the use of Lusophone on political or historical grounds.


3 It is here instructive to read what Oliveira Martins had to say about Portugal’s African colonies in Brasil e as Colonias Portuguesas.


5 For a discussion of the ideology and realities of miscegenation in one colony, see G Bender, Angola under the Portuguese, London: Heinemann, 1978.


7 See here, for example, Marquês do Lavradio, Portugal em Africa depois de 1851, Lisbon, 1936.

8 That is, the establishment of a modern infrastructure and colonial administration, the rational economic “exploitation” of the colonies, etc.

9 Extreme centralization of decision-making, the establishment of a Portuguese economic zone, the use of the colonies as labour reserves, etc. See here G Clarence-Smith, op cit.

10 On Salazar’s colonial economic policies, see G Clarence-Smith, op cit. On Salazar see H Kay, Salazar and modern Portugal, London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1970, a less than satisfactory book.


13 Although to be fair, Newitt (who in this respect is somewhat of an exception) implicitly calls for a more comparative perspective.


15 For one particularly good book on one of these cases, see R Jospeh, Radical nationalism in Cameroun, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977.

16 On the first wave of “socialism”, see C Rosberg and T Callaghy (eds), Socialism in sub-Saharan Africa, Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1979.

17 For an analysis of the concept of people’s war, see P Chabal, Aciluc Carbal, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

18 For one history of the Portugal of that period, see R Robinson, Contemporary Portugal, London: Allen Unwin, 1979.

19 Much as the Algerian war of national liberation is linked with the transition from the Fourth to the Fifth Republic in France.

See, as one example of this approach, J Mittelman, *Underdevelopment and the transition to socialism*, New York: Academic Press, 1981.

See here P Chabal, “People’s war, state formation and revolution in Africa”, *op cit*.

Ibidem.

I draw here from my general discussion on the post-colonial state in *Power in Africa*, *op cit*, chapter 4.


If only because of their involvements in civil conflicts fuelled, wholly or in part, by South Africa.


See here my chapter on political Africanization in *Power in Africa*, *op cit*, chapter 12.


For a development of this argument, see Patrick Chabal, *Power in Africa*, *op cit*, chapter 12.

The need to study the nature of these links is one of the central themes of Patrick Chabal, *Power in Africa*, *op cit*.

Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde.

Cape Verdean members of the PAIGC were (and some remain despite the 1980 coup) influential members of the Guinea-Bissau government.

For an analysis of the events which led to the break between the two countries and in particular the November 1980 coup in Bissau, see my series of articles in *West Africa*, 15 December 1980, 2554-2556; 22/29 December 1980, 2593-2594 and 12 January 1981, 62-63.


Liberal and Marxist analytical traditions were accustomed to focus attention on the nature and role of the state in national politics. Furthermore, the data necessary for the political analysis of the post-colonial African state was accessible. Sources were relatively abundant and easy to locate, state politics was visible and the state’s discourse was both voluble and understandable.


On civil society, see *ibid*, chapter 5; on the hegemonic drive, see chapter 13.


See here my chapters on production and on accumulation and inequality in *Power in Africa*, *op cit*, chapters 6 and 9.