THE OPPOSITION FAITH AND WORKS AS PERSUASIVE DEVICE IN GALATIANS (3:6-14)

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ABSTRACT
This investigation proves that in dealing with the Galatian issue Paul intended his faith-works argument to have a decisive persuasive impact on his audience. The dominant argumentative role played by this opposition is clearly demonstrated by the fact that it is employed to a greater or lesser extent in every pericope throughout the second argument (per 7-12 / 3:1-4:7) of his letter. What is more, in presenting this faith-works argument Paul made use of quite a number of rhetorical persuasive techniques of his day, techniques such as rebuke, interrogation, experience, example, authority, disclosure, dissociation, severance and enthymeme. It seems that what he wanted to drive home was not only that faith was the only means of being put in the right relationship with God, but also that works of the law did not constitute such a means. The reason for this is on the one hand that the law was by nature never intended for this purpose, and on the other that in reality law-observance is under the constant threat of a curse rather than a blessing.

1 THE RHETORICAL SITUATION
It is generally agreed that no reader of an argumentative text, coming from the outside as it were, is in a position to follow or understand the argument concerned unless the rhetorical situation underlying it has first been established. The rhetorical situation includes not only the particular historical situation within which a given dialogue between speaker and hearers (or author and readers) takes place, but also the speaker's/author's perception of that situation as one that requires change, a change that the speaker/author feels can be brought about by verbal argumentation of a particular sort (Stanley 1990:488). And since the audience addressed is a constituent factor in the formation of the argumentation, it is of the utmost importance that the audience has to be constructed in order to understand the argumentation. 'To establish the audience within the rhetorical situation and its role in relation to the other roles means to gain access to the reason why an author has argued in the way he did' (Vorster 1989:22).

Speaking about audience as far as the letter to the Galatians is concerned, it has been contended by Lategan (1989:2-3) that it would seem that we are dealing with three categories of readers, and that we are therefore confronted by an audience of a complex nature. This serves, according to Lategan, as a warning to
proceed with caution in our effort to follow the argumentation of the text. Complex as it may be, it seems fairly obvious that the author's main concern was with a group of Christians of Gentile origin who came under the influence of other people and who were in need of being called back to former convictions.

Closely linked to the notion of audience, is the ‘need’ or ‘exigence’ of a situation which concretises in the cause (causa or quaestio, cf Vorster 1989:17) of a situation, the issue to be addressed. What is important about Galatians is therefore not only the historical audience or the persuaders active among them, but also and especially Paul's perception of the condition of the churches under this persuasion. It is this perception that shaped his response to the prevailing situation (cf Stanley 1990:488). In the case of Galatians we are in fact looking for an answer to a twofold question, namely: What did the opponents actually 'propose' to or demand from the Galatians, and how did the latter respond to the proposal? As far as the proposal is concerned, it seems that we do not need to look further for an answer than Paul's words to Peter in colon 50 (2:14), and especially the words πῶς τὰ ἐν θη ἀναγκάζεται τοι ἰουδαίζετε (see Brinsmead 1982:67). The implication of such a demand was also twofold. Firstly, it implied that salvation could only be attained by being circumcised and by adopting the Jewish way of life with all its precepts and rituals. Secondly, it implied that failure to yield to this demand would make it impossible for Jewish and non-Jewish Christians to become one in Christ.

As far as the Galatians' response to the opponents is concerned, it is clear from the outset that it was so favourable from the opponents' point of view that Paul reacted to it in an ironic and polemic way. And this is what became the reason for writing the letter as Paul himself puts it in cola 5-7 (1:6-7, especially the words μετατίθεσθε...ἐἰς ἐπερον ἐκαγγέλοι). Betz (1979:46) formulates the cause as the Galatian churches being 'in the process of shifting their allegiance away from Paul, their founder, and away from the Pauline form of the gospel to his Jewish-Christian competitors and enemies' (cf also Wuellner 1978:474; Brinsmead 1982:67). The nature of this shifting of their allegiance seems to have been a process of complementing their faith in Christ with an adherence to the Jewish Torah and the accompanying Jewish way of life (Lategan 1992). Whether they were actually forced to be circumcised and to keep the law (thus Howard 1979:19) cannot be deduced from the text. It is in all probability more correct to ascribe this state of affairs to the fact that they became attracted to proposals by Paul's opponents, since whereas Paul had presumably not given them enough practical guidelines to survive as believers in their new mode of existence, the Jewish way of life offered them a set of time-tested rules for the practising of this new faith (Lategan 1992; see also Wuellner 1978:471).
2 THE GENRE OF THE ARGUMENTATION

It is by now common knowledge that a new and provocative way of looking at Galatians was opened up by H D Betz in his paper delivered at the 1974 conference of the SNTS, subsequently published in *New Testament Studies* (1975). Betz’s main contention, namely that Galatians should be interpreted in terms of classical forensic rhetoric, and as a consequence be classified as an ‘apologetic letter’ or rather, if the epistolary framework is removed, as an ‘apologetic speech’ (Betz 1979:15), was duly put into practice in his Hermeneia commentary on Galatians (1979). Although his approach was favourably received and endorsed by certain scholars (for example Brinsmead 1982; cf Hübner 1984:245), it was criticised or at least questioned by a considerable number of others (see especially Longenecker 1990:cxi-cxiii). In the main, two objections were raised against Betz’s view. The first is that the epistolary conventions of the letter, of which many have been pointed out, were too easily ignored as if they were of little consequence for the structure of its contents (see especially Hansen 1989:27-54; Longenecker 1990:cv-cix for a detailed analysis of the epistolary conventions). The second concerns the issue as to whether, in the case of a rhetorical analysis all of Galatians could indeed be classified under the forensic genre or whether it should rather be seen as containing both the forensic and the deliberative (Aune 1981:325; Hansen 1989:59; Smit 1989:7) or only the deliberative (Hall 1987:280; Cosgrove 1988:25; Vouga 1988:291; Stanley 1990:491).

In view of the fact that Betz himself admitted that an analysis of 3:6-4:11 in terms of Graeco-Roman rhetorical conventions is ‘extremely difficult’ (1979:129), and that he had much difficulty in fitting the paraenetical section (Chapters 5-6) into his rhetorical framework (1979:254), as well as the fact that, with the exception of the interrogatio in cola 62-8 (3:1-5) and the exemplum in cola 69-70 (3:6), there is no significant feature in Chapters 3-4 that relates directly to the category of forensic rhetoric (see Longenecker 1990:cxii), all that remains as possible evidence for his thesis, are the first two chapters of Galatians. It seems therefore that the section of the letter on which the topic of this study has a bearing, should be read as deliberative and not forensic. Paul, as a matter of fact, is not seeking a verdict on past actions, as would be the case in forensic speech, but wants to persuade his audience to adopt a certain course of action in the future (Hall 1987:280; Smit 1989:13). To this can be added that ‘Paul’s biblical exegesis in chapters 3-4 reflects more Jewish rhetorical conventions’ (Longenecker 1990:cxii) than Graeco-Roman.

3 PAUL’S ARGUMENT IN COUNTERING THE GALATIAN ISSUE

As is indicated by the explication of the macrostructural relationships in the letter (see Addendum to *Neotestamentica* 26[2]), Paul reacted to the Galatian issue by putting forward two arguments (per 3-6; 7-12 / 1:10-2:21; 3:1-
4:7) to prove the authenticity of his gospel and the reason why it should be adhered to as the only message of salvation. Of these two arguments the second constitutes the immediate context of the topic of this study, because it is in this argument that the opposition faith-work is worked out in considerable detail.

It should, however, be pointed out that Betz (1979:15; see also Brinsmead 1982; Hester 1984:224; Berger 1984:110), on the basis of his forensic approach, does not regard pericopae 3-6 (1:10-2:21) as (first) argument of proof, but classifies them as narratio (1:12-2:14) and propositio (2:15-21) respectively, with the real argument (probatio) starting with colon 62 (3:1). If treated as deliberative, though, the so-called 'narration' also functions as part of the proof (confirmatio) of the argument (Hall 1987:280; see also Du Toit 1991:226-7), and there is therefore good reason for treating pericopae 7-12 (3:1-4:7) as second argument of proof.

It is well-known that the section which is rubricated as 'second argument' in the macro-structural analysis, and generally regarded as the core of Paul's argument in Galatians, is viewed by quite a number of scholars as unlogical, discontinuous and confusing in many respects (cf Hays 1981:340-8; Keck 1979:86; Smit 1986: 17-18). It is especially on the grounds of this section's so-called lack of argumentative coherence that Betz (1979:129) complains that an analysis of it in terms of rhetoric is 'extremely difficult'. In Betz's view there is, however, a good reason for this, and that is the fact that Paul — as a skilled rhetorician — is disguising his argumentative strategy. This is to say, Paul, in conformity with Hellenistic rhetoric, is not arguing in a logical way but with frequent interruption of the argumentative sections by means of dialogue, examples, proverbs, quotations, et cetera (Betz 1979:129; cf Smit 1986:18). Another explanation (solution?), presented by Hays (1981:405-30), is that Paul is not reasoning on the basis of propositional logic, in which consequences necessarily follow from premises, but that his thought is grounded in narrative logic, which is characterised by fitness rather than by logical necessity (cf also Patte 1983:41, convictional logic). If we therefore ask why the events of a particular story are ordered as they are, the answer can only be 'because that is the way it happened' or 'because that is the way the story is told' (Hays 1981:406). What it boils down to is that, in his argumentation, Paul is following the story of the Christ-event which serves as a substructure for the argumentation. Hence the lack of argumentative coherence and propositional logic.

To pursue and evaluate the viability of Hays's proposal will take us too far. Conceding the fact that Paul's argumentation in this section is not easy to follow or to grasp at every point, I am nevertheless in agreement with those who are convinced that Paul certainly intended to say something intelligible (Hays 1981:342), and that this section, in spite of its discontinuities, is bound together by a central or overarching argument or thought (rightly so Du Toit 1991:226).
Before trying to obtain some idea of how Paul went to work with the faith-works opposition in his argumentation, another remark needs to be made. It concerns the question as to what Paul's real perception was with regard to the prevalent situation in the Galatian churches. In other words, what was, in his view, the issue that had to be especially addressed in our section of the letter? Was it: How is man put right with God? Or was it: How do Christians of non-Jewish origin share with Christians of Jewish origin in the promises made to Israel? Traditionally most scholars of Protestant (Lutheran) heritage would opt for the first possibility (cf Stanley 1990:502-5; Hansen 1989:109-16; 159). It is, however, by now fairly common knowledge that this type of approach has come under serious pressure as a result of the criticism, first by Stendahl (1963) and then by Sanders (1977), of the Lutheran notion that justification by faith is the centre of Pauline theology (for a German reaction to these criticisms, see among others, Käsemann 1972; Hübner 1980). Stendahl's contention is that Paul was primarily concerned with the relationship between Jews and Gentiles and that he used as one of his arguments the idea of justification by faith. More or less in the same vein Sanders is of the opinion that the dispute in Galatians is not about 'doing' as such, or about a conflict between 'doing' as such and 'faith' as such (see also Howard 1979:53; Smit 1986:19-20; Cosgrove 1988:42,50; cf Barclay 1988:3-8).

It may be true that Paul's concern in Galatians was not primarily the notion of being put in the right relationship with God by faith, but this in itself would not exclude this notion. As I have already stated above, Paul was seriously concerned with the question as to how the non-Jewish Christians could become members of the people of God and heirs of God's promises without the obligation of also adopting the Jewish way of life. But to argue in favour of the Gentiles' case, he had no other option than to put forward the notion that one is put in the right relationship with God and becomes a member of God's people solely by believing and not by having to do the works of the law as well, by Judaising as it were. How Paul came to this conviction, whether since his entry into Christianity or only gradually as a result of the Jew-gentile problem in early Christianity, is not of importance here. What is of importance is how Paul in fact dealt with the issue he found himself confronted with.

4 THE FAITH-WORKS OPPOSITION AS PERSUASIVE DEVICE

While pericope 8 (3:6-14) plays the central role in Paul's employment of the faith-works opposition as persuasive device in the context of the second argument (per 7-12 / 3:1-4:7), it is in fact pericope 7 (3:1-5) in which the theme of the argument is announced and which is of fundamental importance to the effectiveness and success of the whole argument. It should therefore be seen as determinative for the perspective from which pericope 8 is to be understood (see Cosgrove 1988:40). In pericope 7, which, as indicated above, still fits the foren-
sic type of argument, Paul starts his new argument by employing different well-known rhetorical techniques of his day (see Betz 1979:128-31; Longenecker 1990:99), especially that of rebuke ("Ω αἰώνα τοῖς Γαλάταις), interrogation (six questions in diatribe form), experience (the Galatians’ own experience of the Spirit) and dissociation (dissociating ἀκοή πίστεως from ἔργα νόμου). Of these it is primarily the last two that are of special importance to the purpose of this study.

Although the mnemonic reference to the Spirit does not fall within the scope of this study, it is nevertheless imperative to take note of some aspects of this reference, because it was so crucial to the force of the faith-works argument. The experience of the Spirit the Galatians have had and still have, has furnished Paul with an unassailable and very important strategic advantage over his opponents and over against the Galatians. The Galatians could obviously not deny their receipt of the Spirit and their continuing experience of the gifts of the Spirit (δινώμελες, c 68b / 3:5; see Schlier 1965:125; Betz 1979:135). On the contrary, it seems that if ἐπάνετε in colon 66 (3:4) is read sensu bono, which in all probability is its meaning in the context (thus among others Oepke 1964:67; Van Stempvoort 1972:62; Mussner 1974:209-10; Betz 1979:134; Du Toit 1991:227; Longenecker 1990:104), then the Galatians were indeed enjoying ‘remarkable experiences’ of the Spirit. They must also have put a high premium on these experiences. They are in fact addressed as πεπλατυκοῖ (c 188b / 6:1), and as Betz (1979:296-7) rightly observes, we have every reason to believe that the Galatians themselves approved of this appellation and used it as a self-designation. If our assumption in this regard is correct, it also explains why, although the Spirit never becomes a topic on its own, ‘Paul’s consciousness of the Spirit underlies and ties together all that he says in 3:1-6:10 by way of both argumentation and appeal’ (Longenecker 1990:102; see also Du Toit 1991:227,230). Paul would not have given so much attention to the role of the Spirit, and at such strategic points in his argumentation, if the Galatians were not themselves making certain claims regarding their experiences of the Spirit.

On the basis of this role of the Spirit in the personal experience of the Galatians, Paul can start his second and most important argument with a penetrating interrogation. Put in forensic terms, we can say that the factum to be defended is identical with the experience of the ‘jury’, the Galatians themselves (Betz 1979:29). He can call on them as first-hand witnesses, or more correctly, as themselves the living evidence of the fact that they have not only received the Spirit, but are still experiencing his working in their lives. The questions that Paul is now asking, are thus based on a matter on which there is agreement (cf Longenecker 1990:97), and which consequently does not need to be proved.

The real argumentative thrust of the interrogation is, however, contained in the question as to the basis on which the Galatians’ experience came about. If
they would recall how they received the Spirit, no further argument would be necessary and Paul would be in a position to rest his case (cf Longenecker 1990:101). It is at this point that the technique of dissociation is employed. This argument by dissociation forces the readers to choose between mutually exclusive alternatives. It is an either-or choice (Hansen 1989:109). There can only be one answer to the question as to whether the Spirit was received by ‘believing what was heard’ (ἐξ ἀκοῆς πιστεύως) that is ‘believing the gospel’ (rightly so Sanders 1977:482) or by ‘doing what the law requires’ (ἐξ ἔργων νόμου). The answer is and can only be in favour of the first possibility, as Paul and the Galatians knew very well.

But this is not the full story. The implication of this fact is evidently that faith and works of the law are fundamentally incompatible and mutually exclusive. If the Spirit has been received as a result of believing the gospel, it naturally excludes the works of the law as a means of receiving the Spirit. As becomes clear from the context, ‘faith’ and ‘works’ are as incompatible as the ‘Spirit’ and the ‘flesh’ (c 65ab /3:3; see especially per 18 /5:16-26; cf Fletcher 1982:222-41). Paul is therefore not only reminding his readers of the way in which their receival of the Spirit came about. He is also, at the same time, juxtaposing faith and works in such a manner that it is made clear that while it is self-evident that faith is the means of receiving the Spirit, works of the law are not.

What is not explicitly stated at this stage of the argument, but is of crucial importance to its force, only becomes clear later on in the argumentation. This is the notion that the Spirit’s receival by the believers and his indwelling in them, signify the fact that in Christ they have been freed from the law and made (adopted as) children of God (c 113-4 /4:4-6). Thus, having received the Spirit means freedom, to be free from the obligation of adhering to Jewish religious practices that have nothing to do with faith. And it is precisely this freedom that Paul, as outcome of his argument, appeals to the Galatians to remain steadfast in (c 152-4 /5:1). In the light of all this, it would be the utmost foolishness indeed if the Galatians were to choose to supplement their faith with ‘works of the law’. In such an event they would not only forfeit their freedom in the Spirit, but also everything else that their experience of the Spirit stands for, especially sonship and inheritance (cf c 110 /3:29; c 114-7 /4:6-7).

In order to defend and secure this freedom of the Galatians, Paul now makes extensive use of the opposition faith-works in the rest of this (second) argument (per 7-12). An overview of the incidence of this opposition in this unit clearly demonstrates its importance as persuasive device in Paul’s argumentation. It occurs to a greater or lesser extent, either explicitly or implicitly, in almost every pericope of this unit (see Addendum towards the end of this article). As shown by the configuration of the pericopae relationships of this unit (see Addendum to Neotestamentica 26[2]), pericope 8 comprises the scopus of the faith-works ar-
gument, while each of 9, 10 and 11 is in itself an explicatory elaboration on the theme. Pericope 12 concludes the argument almost in the form of a doxology on sonship, freedom and inheritance through Christ and the Spirit (cf Du Toit 1991:230). Although pericope 8 logically follows on 7, it (8) is actually the explication of the premise already stated in 6, namely that man is put right with God by faith in Jesus Christ, and never by doing what the law requires (c 51c-i / 2:16). Here (in per 6) works are already fully dissociated from faith as a means of being put in the right relationship with God. And this dissociation is maintained throughout the second argument.

Having announced the theme of his argument in pericope 7, as indicated above, Paul concludes his argumentation in this pericope with a very strategic move by appealing to Abraham as the prime example (exemplum argument) of what has been argued up to this point. Although in the New Testament καθότις is often used in combination with γέραπταται as a citation formula and rarely absolutely, in this context it should be treated as exemplum reference, as suggested by quite a number of recent commentators (among others Schlier 1965:127; Lietzmann 1971:18; Mussner 1974:213; Lührmann 1978:50; Bruce 1982:152; Barrett 1985:22-3; Longenecker 1990:112; contra Betz 1979:140; Hays 1981:355-6).

The importance of the calling of Abraham onto the scene must in all probability be seen against the background of the use the opponents made of Abraham in propagating their ‘gospel’. There is ample evidence that, in the Jewish traditions about Abraham, circumcision was closely linked to the covenant God made with Abraham, and this view would have been easy to defend on the basis of Genesis 17:10-14. There can be little doubt that the opponents were citing Abraham as the great example of faith coupled with circumcision and the adherence to the religious lifestyle of the people of the covenant, the Jews (cf Barclay 1987:88; 1988:52-6,65-6; Hansen 1989:170-3; Longenecker 1990:112-3). Against this background it was vital for Paul to prove, by reference to Abraham, that the opponents had it wrong. Abraham could only be an example of faith, the faith by which one is put in the right relationship with God. What the Galatians have experienced through faith, is comparable to what was experienced by Abraham (cf Barclay 1988:88). And it is precisely this kind of faith, over against works of the law, that becomes the theme of the next pericope.

Although the argument from experience might have sufficed and Paul might have rested his case, he does not stop his argumentation at this point, but proceeds with an argument from authority. Assuming that the Galatians are accepting the authority of Scripture as he himself does, he wishes to prove the soundness of his argumentation from Scripture. Starting with a typical epistolary disclosure formula (γινώσκετε ἀρετή ὄτι, c 7.1) he endeavours to bring to the Galatians’ attention the logical consequence of the quotation (Gn 15:6) at the end of the previous pericope (γινώσκετε is in agreement with Betz 1979:141 and others,
to be taken as imperative and not as indicative, contra Longenecker 1990:114). In
doing this, he employs an argument by enthymeme (a syllogism with an implied
premise, moving in this case backwards from conclusion to premise). The con-
clusion (ἐπὶ, c 71 / 3:7) is derived from the implicit premise that as God dealt
with Abraham, so will he deal with all people (cf Hansen 1989:112). This means
that as Abraham was put right with God by his faith, so also are those who be-
lieve children of Abraham.

We have every reason to assume that the expression ποιμένικοτοι Ἀβραὰμ was polem-
ically motivated, because of what must have been claimed by the opponents
concerning sonship of Abraham. Longenecker (1990:114) is correct in pointing
out that it was not a habit of Paul’s to commend Christ to the Gentiles on Old
Testament grounds or to explain how they were related to Abraham and the Jew-
ish nation. There must therefore have been a compelling reason for the introd-
uction of the theme of sonship of Abraham, a theme which plays a dominant role up
to the end of Chapter 4. Sonship of Abraham must have been a disputed issue
among the Galatians (Hansen 1989:113), probably because the opponents
claimed that the real sons of Abraham were those who relied on the law (οἱ ἐκ

Against this background Paul’s thesis that those ἐκ πίστεως are the (real)
children of Abraham (c 71 / 3:7) is provocative, because it not only implies that
they need not meet the requirements of the law to be Abraham’s children, but
also that those who are not ἐκ πίστεως, cannot claim to be Abraham’s children at
all. Not only can this thesis be proved from Scripture (c 72c1.1 / 3:8), it can also
be demonstrated by the receipt of the ‘blessing of Abraham’ by all who believe
(c 73 / 3:9). The ‘blessing of Abraham’ (cf c 80c / 3:14) spoken of here, most
evidently refers to the ‘justification’ of the Gentiles, as depicted in colon 72b
(3:8: ὅτι ἐκ πίστεως δικαιοῦται ἡ ἐφαπλοτος; rightly so Williams 1988:713, n10;
Stanley 1990:494; cf Cosgrove 1988:50 who sees it as an implicit reference to the
Since, however, the two τίκα clauses in colon 80cd (2:14) are coordinate in struc-
ture, and the second is therefore not subsidiary to the first (rightly so Longeneck-
er 1990:123), the ‘blessing of Abraham’ in the first clause cannot have the same
reference as ἐποικείλεξις in the second. The ‘blessing of Abraham’ shared in by
the Gentiles is therefore to be distinguished from the Spirit as gift. As
‘justification’ by faith it constitutes the becoming part of the community of be-
lievers in Christ by believing the gospel. But what does it mean in real life? If we
look at Paul’s final pronouncements at the end of his second argument, it seems
that the blessing of Abraham comprises the believer’s embracing by faith of the
νοεσια (c 113f/4:5) offered to him in Christ Jesus, and therefore becoming
God’s child, and heir of the Spirit as gift (c 114-7 / 4:6-7). In the end, however, it
would not be wrong to say that it ultimately boils down to life in the Spirit (cf
However, the real working out of the consequence of the incompatibility of faith and works in this pericope takes place in clusters B and C (c 74-9 / 3:10-12). Here Paul makes use of the argument by *severance* in order to exclude δοσις ἐξ ἔργων νόμου from the believers within the circle of the Abraham blessing (οἱ ἐκ πίστεως). As a result of the propaganda of the opponents, the οἱ ἐκ πίστεως and the δοσις ἐξ ἔργων νόμου have become merged, and Paul now wants to sever them from each other (Hansen 1989:116). Another indication of severance is the fact that in the case of those ἐκ πίστεως the definite article (ὁ) is used, while those ἐξ ἔργων νόμου are referred to by the indefinite δοσις. In all probability this is done in order to portray them as shadowy figures. These two groups are, however, not only severed. The different contrasting consequences of their respective positions are also spelled out in no uncertain terms: those building on faith receive Abraham's blessing (εὐλογοῦσαν αὐτῷ, c 73); those relying on works of the law are living under a curse (ὑπὸ κατάρας εἰσίν, c 74b).

Paul then defends his thesis by citing Deuteronomy 27:26 (LXX), 'a highly provocative move on his part' (Cosgrove 1988:53). The reason for calling this move provocative, a move that has puzzled commentators, is that while Paul wants to argue that lawkeepers as such live under a curse, Deuteronomy 27:26 pronounces a curse on those who *do not* do the law, not on those who *do* it (cf also Barclay 1988:67). It would therefore seem as if Paul not only contradicts himself, but that he is actually underscoring what his opponents have maintained all the way, namely that one should 'do' the law. Paul is, however, only seemingly contradicting himself. What he wants to make clear, is illustrated in cluster C (c 76-9 / 3:11-12).

Two texts from the Old Testament (Hab 2:4; Lv 18:5) serve to prove his point, namely that 'faith' and (works of the) 'law' are mutually exclusive when it comes to the basis on which one shall live. The law has nothing to do with faith (c 78, ὁ δὲ νόμος ὁυκ ἐστὶν ἐκ πίστεως), but only with 'doing' (ποιησάς). (Ἀλλὰ, c 79, is strongly adversative in order to emphasise the contrast.) According to Habakkuk 2:4, it is only on the basis of being put right with God by faith that one shall live. According to Leviticus 18:5, it is by doing what the law requires that one shall live. And this is where the curse of the law comes in: whoever wants to rely on doing what the law requires, constantly lives under the curse of the law. Failing to do what the law requires, results in the execution of the curse. Paul is, however, in this context, not speculating on whether the law can be quantitatively fulfilled or not (contra Oepke 1964:72; Lietzmann 1971:11; Mussner 1974:224-6; Hansen 1989:119; Longenecker 1990:118). It rather seems that for him the threat of the curse does not depend on the inability of man to quantitatively fulfill the law in the first place, but on the fact that the law should be 'done' as such (Schlier 1965:134; somewhat differently Betz 1979:145-6).
thereby harbouring in itself the threat of the curse in the event of non-fulfilment. The ultimate reason for the inadequacy of the Torah-observance as a route to 'blessing' is therefore not the inability of its adherents to fulfil the Torah, but rather something in the very nature of the law itself (Stanley 1990:502). Paul does not explicitly say why this is so, or why 'living in the prescriptions' of the law (ζησεταλ ἐν αὐτοῖς, c 79) is not an acceptable way of living. It seems that he just concludes that righteousness cannot be by the law, because it is by faith in Christ (cf Sanders 1977:544). The implication, though, seems also to be that it cannot be by the law, because law-observance inherently results in the curse of the law, and eventually death. He, however, does not distinguish positively and negatively between faith and works (as such) respectively on the grounds that the first should be seen as belonging to a system of grace and the last to a system of merit (see Howard 1979:51-4 for objections against this traditional interpretation of Paul's faith-works pronouncements). He is not divorcing believing from doing, but of his attack is the works of the law (Barclay 1988:82).

It therefore seems that Paul is excluding works of the law as a means of 'justification', by going down to the root of the problem, that is the fact, according to him, that the law was never meant to play a role in putting one in the right relationship with God or to bring life, as he puts it in colon 96b (3:21). In his summary of Paul's contention at this point, Stanley (1990:505) is right in saying that the Galatian gentile Christian who wants to abide by the law, is left in a no-win situation: observing the law can add nothing to what faith promises in regard to 'life', but it can still place anyone who falls short of perfect fulfilment under God's 'curse'. The obvious conclusion is that the Galatians have nothing to gain and everything to lose from pursuing the way of the law.

At this point in his argumentation Paul abruptly brings Christ onto the scene in an asyndetic manner, which lends rhetorical force to the change of subject (Longenecker 1990:121). The sudden juxtaposition of Christ (c 80a) and law (c 74-79) dramatically emphasises the dissociation of the two alternatives of being 'in Christ' (ἐν Χριστῷ Ἡ γεύς, c 80c) or living 'in the law' (ἐν νόμῳ, c 76). The first frees one from the curse of the law and opens the door to sharing in the blessing of Abraham and the receival of the Spirit. The second leaves one under God's curse and shuts the door to justification, to life in Christ (Hansen 1989:122). The argument by severance is also taken a decisive step further. Those who have been freed from the curse (ἡμᾶς, c 80a), and those for whom Christ has become a curse (ἡμῶν, c 80b), are clearly severed from δούλοι ἐξ ἐργανυντὸν νόμον (c 74a), and the aim of the argument is to demonstrate that it is the cross of Christ which has accomplished this complete severance (Hansen 1989:123). The former are undoubtedly to be identified with ὁ ἐκ πίστεως (c 71.1.1, 73), whether they may be Jews or Gentiles. Thus the opposition faith and works is again highlighted, but this time as something that has a soteriological origin and
a Christological basis. By saying that Christ has freed ‘us’ from the curse of the law, Paul is in fact saying that Christ has freed all believers from the obligation to fulfil the law in order to share in the life in union with Christ, irrespective of the question as to whether one is of Jewish or Gentile origin. In this manner, Jew and Gentile can become one in Christ, without the need for either of them to supplement their faith with adherence to the precepts of the law. Redemption from the law is, however, more than just a redemption from the law’s tyranny of division between Jew and gentile (contra Howard 1979:64). The termination of the division between Jew and gentile is the result of the redemption from the law, not the aim. The aim is the salvation of mankind.

5 ELABORATION ON THE FAITH-WORKS OPPOSITION IN THE REST OF THE SECOND ARGUMENT

Having stated his case regarding the incompatibility of faith and works of the law, and therefore the incompatibility of a life arising out of faith in Jesus Christ on the one hand, and a life relying on the Jewish lifestyle on the other hand, Paul goes on to elaborate on this theme by means of additional arguments in support of his main argument. In order to obtain an idea of how he goes on to employ the faith-works opposition in this endeavour, it would be worthwhile to follow his line of argument by undertaking a cursory survey of the most prominent argumentative features of the remaining pericopae of this second argument.

* What is the function of pericope 9 in the faith-works argument? Although not much is explicitly said with regard to the faith-works opposition, Paul is stressing an important point concerning the question as to a possible danger of the law (works) interfering with the realisation (through faith) of what has been promised by God. Using a will as illustration (c 82-4 / 3:15), he gives the assurance that God’s promise (i.e. the Spirit, cf c 80d / 3:14) to Abraham and his descendant, Christ (c 86.1.2bc), cannot be nullified by the law (c 87). The fact of the matter is that the law did not only arrive on the scene much later, but that law and promise are also of a totally different nature and intent, and function on totally different plains. He concludes his argument by reaffirming the fact that the receiveal of the Spirit as a gift, as inheritance, does not depend on the law (works), but is a gracious fulfilment of God’s promise to Abraham (c 88-9). The term κληρονομία which is now introduced for the first time in the argumentation, indicating the content of the promise, has an eschatological flavour and most definitely refers to the Spirit (Schlier 1965:150, n1; Mussner 1974:242). Words like δεινοθηκη (c 83a, 87.1a) and χαριζωμαι (c 89) not only underline God’s graciousness in giving his Spirit, but also the fact that the Spirit can only be received by ‘faith’. As colon 88a clearly implies, the law cannot give the Spirit, that is the Spirit cannot be received by doing the ‘works of the law’. As is the case with pericope 8, this pericope not only concludes with the notion of the Spirit as a gift, but also with
that of sonship of Abraham on which the promise has a bearing.

* In light of what has been argued thus far, it then becomes imperative that the status, place and function of the law should be clarified, as is done in pericope 10. The question τί οὖν ὁ νόμος (c 90) is therefore to be expected. There is consequently no reason to treat this pericope, and part of pericope 11 (c 98-100 / 3:23-25), as a digression from the main argument (rightly so Longenecker 1990:135; cf Schlier 1965:151; Mussner 1974:244; contra Betz 1979:163). Two questions, rhetorical in nature, are asked: the first regarding the purpose and function of the law (c 90), the second regarding the relation of the law to the promises of God (c 94). The answers given are, however, not flattering — to say the least. As many would agree, they are rather derogatory. The first in essence runs like this: the law was added (προστεθη, c 91a, probably to the covenant and the promise) because of the transgressions (c 91a); it was of temporary character (c 91bc); and was furthermore handed down by angels (c 91d), with a man acting as go-between (c 92). In these pronouncements about the law a clear indication can already be detected with regard to the answer to be expected to the second question. It clearly shows that the law cannot endanger the fulfilment of God's promises (c 94-5). It was by nature not meant to be in competition with the promises and does not have the potential to be a substitute. The reason for this is that it has no life-giving quality or power and therefore no function or ability to put people in the right relationship with God (c 96). All it did was to keep people subjected to sin (c 97a), so that the gift of the Spirit (ἐπαγγελία) could be given to those who believe in Jesus Christ (c 97b). Again a pericope ends on a climax, namely with the Spirit, and with the notion that the Spirit as a gift is received by faith and not by the works of the law.

* Pericope 11 basically juxtaposes two dispensations: that of the (works of the) law and that of faith. These two are not only dissociated from each other because of the differences as to what each has to offer, but also because of the fact that the one has replaced the other and has thereby caused it to become outdated and irrelevant. The opposition faith-works is especially highlighted in cluster A (c 98-100/3:23-25) through the employment of two consecutive, but also inverted chiasms (abba-baab, mistakenly not indicated as such in the discourse analysis). In both cases πίστις and νόμος are juxtaposed, πίστις explicitly every time, and νόμος twice explicitly and twice implicitly as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>πίστις (c 98a)</th>
<th>νόμος (c 98b)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(νόμος) (c 98c)</td>
<td>πίστις (c 98d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>νόμος (c 99a)</td>
<td>πίστις (c 99b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>πίστις (c 100a)</td>
<td>(νόμος) (c 100b)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Clusters A and B thus respectively depict the existential realities that are to be associated with the two different dispensations. That of the law is one of being kept locked up like a prisoner, of being looked after and controlled like a child (c 98-9). That of faith is to be free, to be a child(ren) of God by faith in Jesus Christ (c 101). It is to be one with Christ through baptism into his body and to be one with those, whether Jew or Greek, whether slave or free person, who have been baptised into Christ (c 101-9). Again a pericope culminates with an explicit reference to sonship of Abraham (‘Αβραάμ απέρμια, c 110b) and an implicit reference to the gift of the Spirit as fulfilment of the promise (c 110c).

* Pericope 12 now draws the conclusion to what has been argued in pericopae 8-11. The semantic and thematic markers prominent in this passage are those of κληρονόμος / υίος and δοῦλος, respectively representing life ἐκ πίστεως and life ἔξ ἐργών νόμου. The sending of Jesus Christ features very strongly, the Son through whose subjection to the law men can become sons of God. Again a sharp contrast is drawn between the old dispensation under the law, that of slavery (c 111-2), and the new one of faith, that of sonship (c 114-7). Again the Spirit crowns the argument of this pericope as the one through whom the freedom from the law and the sonship of God is actualised in the life of ὁ ἐκ πίστεως. Sonship of Abraham has receded in favour of sonship of God, which all the time was what can be called the essence of sonship of Abraham.

What can now be regarded as the main observations resulting from our survey of the material? In my opinion the most important feature that should be taken note of is the recurrence in a climactic manner of the ‘sonship of Abraham’ theme and especially the ‘Spirit’ theme. Seen against the background of the faith-works opposition, it seems that all of these pericopae want to underline the notion that being ἐκ πίστεως means to be blessed by being a child of Abraham, means to be free from an obligation to adhere to the law, and that the Spirit is not only the guarantee of this freedom, but also it actualise by making it an existential experience in the life of the believer. All of this is to show that a life ἔξ ἐργών νόμου is incompatible with a life ἐκ πίστεως, because the former is a life in slavery and a life under a curse.

How mutually exclusive and contradictory a life ἔξ ἐργών νόμου and a life ἐκ πίστεως are, is clearly shown by the following oppositional concepts and situations respectively associated with each of the two:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Works (Law)</th>
<th>Faith (Gospel)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>flesh</td>
<td>Spirit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sin</td>
<td>‘righteousness’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>curse</td>
<td>blessing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>death</td>
<td>life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bondage</td>
<td>freedom</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
being a slave  
cut off from Christ  
outside God's grace

being God's child  
being God's heir  
promise

The pointing out of the absolute impossibility of combining these two modes of existence has been the sole objective of the employment of the faith-works opposition as persuasive device.

6 CONCLUSION

What should therefore be our answer to the question as to how Paul responded to the quaestio in the Galatian situation? That he reacted sharply and without excusing anybody, is beyond doubt. That he stated his case in radical terms is also not to be denied. There is no sense in trying to water down his arguments, and one has no right to do so. On the basis of the cross of Christ and of the gospel as God's power to save all who believe, he just had to plead the Gentiles' case of only having to believe if they wanted to share in the life in union with Christ Jesus, a life in the freedom guaranteed and actualised by the Spirit, without the obligation to adhere to the Jewish lifestyle. In this process he had to totally reject the notion of supplementing faith with whatever form of law observance. He also had to reject, in principle, any notion of 'doing' the law as a means of being put in the right relationship with God, of coming to life in Christ. It is Christ who has freed humanity from the obligation of 'doing' the law in order to live, and not an idea fabricated by Paul. This does not necessarily mean that he outrightly rejected the doing of what the law required or that he wanted the Jewish lifestyle to be abandoned by Jewish or even gentile Christians. The only reservation is that it should not be practised by or forced onto people as a preconditon for sharing in the life in Christ, because the law and the observance of the law were never intended for this purpose. Implemented in this way, the law elicits a curse rather than a blessing, enslaves rather than sets free. Faith and the Spirit, on the contrary, set one free to bear the fruit of the Spirit. And this can best be described as 'faith that works through love' (c 160c/5:6).

ADDENDUM

Explicit and implicit incidence of the opposition faith and works in
Paul's second argument
(Cola numbers in brackets)

Pericope 7

εργα (63b)  
πίστις (63c)
εργα (68c)  
πίστις (68d)
Pericope 8

πίστις (71.1.1; 73)  
νόμος (= ἔργα, 76)  
πίστις (78)  

έργα (74)  
πίστις (77)  
ποιήσις (= ἔργα, 79)

Pericope 9

νόμος (= ἔργα, 88a)  

ἐπαγγελία (= πίστις, 89)

Pericope 10

νόμος (= ἔργα, 91a)  

πίστις (97b)

Pericope 11

πίστις (98a)  
συγκλείω (= νόμος / ἔργα, 98c)  
νόμος (= ἔργα, 99a)  
πίστις (100a)  

νόμος (= ἔργα, 98b)  
πίστις (98d)  
πίστις (99b)  
παιδαγωγός (= νόμος = ἔργα, 100b)

Pericope 12

στοιχείον (112a) νόμος (113e = ἔργα)  
δοῦλος (= ἔργα, 115)  

ὑποθεσία (= πίστις, 113f)  
ὑός (= πίστις, 116)

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