Who is speaking?
Intertextuality and textual influence

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ABSTRACT
This article, taking as its point of departure Julia Kristeva's problem of intertextuality posing as banal source criticism, discusses the problems of intertextuality masquerading as an indicator of textual influence. It is suggested that much of the work done under the rubric of intertextuality rather fits source or redaction criticism. As a dialogue of voices, intertextuality implies that on each text falls the reflection of other texts, leading to an uncontrollable interaction between texts, thereby destroying the monological concept of language and meaning. Textual influence, regarded as an indication of a unidirectional causality, is not intertextuality's cross reference. It is suggested that source and redaction criticism fall under the rubric of textual influence and cannot serve as an indication for intertextuality because of a difference in their views on the role of the human being in the information process, the text as object and the problem of referentiality.

1 INTRODUCTION
To modern or Cartesian philosophy the answer to the question who is speaking is unmistakably the human being. The human being is regarded as lord and master of his or her own thoughts. Telling and proclamation, of animals, trees, angels or gods, only take place by virtue of the word of the human being (cf Ijsseling 1976:127). However, people, when they really have something to say, always invoke some higher authority. The ancient Hebrew prophets invoked a divine order and the ancient Greek poets invoked the Muse. To them, it was not really a question of speaking, but of listening: to speak is to let oneself be spoken to by the divine word (cf Ijsseling 1976:129). To speak is to listen.

Reading implies listening to the voice of the author in a text. But the author does not primarily own the text. There are different voices involved. Firstly, there are the voices that participated wittingly or unwittingly in the formation of the text to which the author listened and reacted to in the act of writing. One can say that the text itself consists of different layers of voices. As if it is not enough that readers are confronted by these different voices in the text, they read the text with different voices too. Not only do they read the text in a particular time and under particular circumstances, giving rise to
a particular voice, but they are able to vary the time and circumstances under which they read, so that they can read the text with multiple voices.

The claim of voices embedded in a text and in the reading process puts forth the matter of textual influence and/or intertextuality. In an effort to experiment with the new possibilities that other disciplines offer, biblical scholars in the past drew literary theoretical categories into the biblical textual debate without being able at that stage to distinguish the consequences of drawing on those categories. One instance is the use of *intertextuality* in literary historical studies to establish the sources of a given text.

Is the critic's task to look into the *origins* of the voices in the text or to look at the *unlimited possibilities* of new arguments and texts opening up as a result of the interaction of these different voices? In my mind, both are possible and necessary, but not under the common denominator of intertextuality. There is a marked difference between intertextuality and textual influence, a difference that has not been taken into consideration in the past. To establish the sources of the text, in other words, to establish those texts that influenced the target text in a significant way, is to do source criticism. Looking at the interaction of the different voices in the text and within the reader, is to indicate the intricate intertextual relationship that comes into being in the reading process. To my mind, intertextuality assumes webs of relations producing texture. It is not a banal source criticism in the guise of textual influences.

What you are about to read in this article is nothing more than an *Eintopf* of themes discussed in other essays by other authors. You will be treated to an academic (hopefully) discourse reflecting the variety of sources that influenced my own position(s). What about intertextuality in the ensuing debate? I am faced with a dilemma: I am talking about things postmodern, yet the mode in which I will do it is modern, simply because I will be inclined to define and establish certainty regarding the understanding of textual influence and intertextuality in order to refute textual influences as intertextuality!

The article proceeds in the following way: it starts with a discussion on intertextuality and Julia Kristeva's fear of taking intertextuality as source criticism. Secondly, the article will look into the workings of source/redaction criticism within reader-response criticism. Thirdly, it will entertain the late Willem Vorster's use of intertextuality and the problems his use created. Lastly, the article, emphasising intertextuality as an act of interpretation, will evoke some aspects of ideological criticism.
2 INTERTEXTUALITY

2.1 Dialogue between voices

It is said that intertextuality is not a feature of a particular genre of texts, but is characteristic of all texts (cf Phillips 1992:286). Intertextuality presupposes the hearing of voices, the seeing of pictures, the memory of experiences and situations, the feeling of emotions, the smelling of scents, the sensation of tasting and the experience of intuition. When I dream, I hear voices and see people or things I know from everyday life. In nightmares I experience events I dread to experience in ordinary life. In sweet dreams (and some more than sweet) I experience feelings and emotions one can only 'dream' of. But they are there because they have already been inscribed in some way or the other in me, as reader / writer / dreamer. Whether I dream or whether I am awake, I am constantly engaged with an environment which leaves its mark on me. When I am making food, I am reminded of a poem someone wrote while I am following the recipe; when I talk, I cannot but refer to something I have read somewhere or seen on television. All these texts continuously relativise what I am doing at the moment of memory. It is simply impossible to be engaged at any particular time with only one text speaking in a single voice, as was the case in Michael Bakhtin's time with the monologicity of the Soviet state (Stalinist and totalitarian) who banned his writings.

The heuristic principle of Bakhtin's dialogicity (Bakhtin 1969:58–60) is the medieval carnival, which he found in Renaissance literature that made little change to political, literary and other institutional forms of medieval Europe (cf Toulmin 1990:22). Renaissance literature of the late fifteenth century displayed an open-mindedness and skeptical tolerance, propagating human modesty as a tool limiting a dogmatism that used to elevate general disputes to the level of political disputes, turning them into a matter of life and death (cf Toulmin 1990:25). One of the most potent instruments illustrating human limitations was the carnival, with its elevation and humiliation, change and disguise, its intimate-familiar language, cynical and open-heartedness, praise and abuse, never refuting rival positions, only showing the lack of a basis to assert or deny that position.

The carnival (a concept not very familiar in Protestant South Africa) served as a steam-valve for the monolithic, serious, strong hierarchical life of fear, dogmatism, honour and piety. On certain days of the year, it was pos-

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1 Phillips’ statement is ironic. Intertextuality, as a modality of postmodernity, assumes in this statement a universal character, supplying us with yet another grand narrative or meta-narrative (à la Lyotard) with which to approach texts. In my opinion, it is a condition quite inimical to a postmodern or late modern approach to texts, denying texts universal validity.
sible to set yourself free to lead a second life filled with ambivalent laughter, sacrilege, and profanations. It was a time of familiar contact with everyone. The carnival celebrated polarities, reconciling the irreconcilable. All that was separated by the monolithic and hierarchical life now became united and mixed. Bakhtin (1969:62) speaks of a ‘fröhliche Relativität’ in the place of absoluteness, leading to an ambivalence of death and birth, laughter and pain.

The carnival creates a public space for dialogue. It is the main arena in which the entire people of a village could participate in enhancing the poor and wretched and in embarrassing the rich and the powerful (Bakhtin 1969:56). Every act is a relativising of another act, every symbol, clothing or escapade questions the absolute validity of other symbols, clothing or doings. The powerful became parodied by the subordinates, subverting the ruling elite’s monological acts. Yet, the dialogue is hidden, as if one sees only one partner talking and reacting to answers of the other partner without hearing what the other is saying (cf Bakhtin 1969:124).

It is this double structure of the carnival that Bakhtin transposes to texts and words. He distinguishes between the object orientated word and the strange word (1969:107). However, as long as the context does not change and as long as the author remains in control, posing him or herself as the last signifying instance, the text remains monological. Ambivalence sets in as soon as the author, as last signifying instance, is bypassed or overruled.

One example is the narrator functioning as a substitute for the author’s word. The narrator as inscribed in a text remains dependent on the author’s voice which, in turn, remains responsible for the double focusing of words brought into play. Bakhtin refers in this instance to Stilisierung where the strange word sets in, yet the author stays in control and uses strange words for his or her own purposes. It can be linked to what Van Wolde (1990:341) calls ‘marked intertextuality’ involving the author’s intention.

But what if the author is no longer in control, as in sskas, or the oral word/dialogue or voice? Lachmann (1984:493) suggests one cannot understand Bakhtin’s dialogicity without knowing what he meant by voice. In oral speech, the narrator’s voice is never ‘objective’: the narrator always bring into play his or her own thoughts and experiences. S/he always brings into play a particular social voice, an intellectual level as well as a particular world view (Bakhtin 1969:116). It is as if the narrator and author are in dialogue with one another and the result is seen in ambivalent words.²

² The narrator, in his or her original status as storyteller, is strange to literature, but the author is not always allowed to speak directly. In a monological society the author can only express the existing authoritative points of view and ideological values. Thinking of James Scott’s idea of the hidden and public transcript (1990), the author creates within the ‘public’ transcript of a narrator a ‘hidden’ transcript, the strange word, which entertains a hidden polemic. Behind the public mask of subordination,
Dialogicity serves to unmask the power of any word or text to say what it means. There is always a hidden transcript deconstructing the significance a particular period or instance attached to a text or word. No word is free from any value. The word originates from another context and is already soaked with strange meanings (Bakhtin 1969:130). The word is not a thing, but a continuously moving ever-changing medium of dialogical contact (1969:129). The word only lives when transmitted from person to person, from context to context. There is simply no last word. Every creative intention, thought, feeling, or experience can only exist in the medium of the word, refracting or rebounding other meanings already inhabiting the word.

Transposed to the level of texts, Bakhtin (1979:352) regards literary texts (the novel par excellence) as a dialogue with foreign texts. Because each word oversteps its limits, no text can be analysed only in terms of itself. Each understanding consists of the bringing into relation of this text with other texts, as well as the transformation into the (new) context of the reader. The text before the reader is the point of departure and the reader moves from this text backwards to past contexts and then again forward to his or her present context. The text can only live when it is brought into contact with other texts (Bakhtin 1979:353).

According to Lachmann (1983:68) the concept of intertextuality introduced a double function in literature: a reinterpretation of known extra-texts as well as a first interpretation of contemporary texts. To make literature means to make from literature. It entails a further writing and a re-writing (Lachmann 1983:67).

Bakhtin's textual dialogue, rejecting pure parallelism of textual phenomena, accepts that on each text falls the reflection of other texts, leading to an uncontrollable interaction between texts. The echoing of texts destroys the monological concept of language and meaning. This never ceasing dialogue leads to an infinite process of understanding in which the sign community can participate on the grounds of their own social and semantic experiences. The textual dialogue always takes place within a social milieu (Bakhtin 1979:357). Lachmann (1983:70) supports this by stressing the particular cultural disposition involved, any attempt at clarification thus being futile. Ambivalence has become a social value.

there is a hidden transcript which relativises the power of the ruling elite. It is a carnival as it were, where the subordinates can hide behind their masks and, not being sanctioned under normal, non-mask-wearing circumstances, tout the powers of the day.
2.2 Textual influence

Intertextuality has a heuristic value in unsettling textual interpretation. The infinite circularity of words referring to other words causes every word to be the intertext of every other word. On each text falls the reflection of other texts, leading to an uncontrollable interaction between texts, destroying the monological concept of language and meaning. Intertextuality does not provide greater interpretive certainty.

Intertextuality was born of an anticolonialist resistance to the concept of hegemonic influence, says Friedman (1991:152). She ties its advent with the intellectual overthrow in France in 1968 by the vanguard of poststructuralism of the ancient regime of humanism and its interwovenness with the nation-state idea and imperialism. To her, it signalled the death of the author, and with the author, the study of influence as a focal point for analysis.

Influence suggests a principle of causality in which one person or thing changes as a result of the action of another more powerful force. The term influence subsumes a source, an origin, an agency that flows into or acts upon another (ibid). Agency belongs to the originator and passive reception and transformation to the other.

The word influence suggests a power relation between the coloniser as conqueror, envisioning his influence as a hegemonic penetration of the conquered, the colonised. Kristeva, living on the border between European civilisation and Soviet domination in Bulgaria, found Bakhtin’s concept of dialogic and polyvocal texts attractive, because they suggested active negotiation on the part of the colonised (Friedman 1991:152). With the concept of intertextuality she raised, the hegemony imposed by the ruling elite can be broken in turning the text into a scene of dialectical and conflictual processes, resisting the principles of hegemony endemic to the word influence (ibid).

However, Friedman suggests (1991:154) that the discourses about influence and intertextuality cannot be kept untainted by each other. Kristeva’s use of Bakhtin to expound her theory of intertextuality embodies the principles of influence: he is the author of her ideas and in her presentation of his ideas, she recognises the authority of his influence on her.

In the discussion on the links between intertextuality and influence, intertextuality is sometimes regarded as an enlargement of the notion of influence, referring to ‘relations built on dyads of transmission from one unity (author, work, tradition) to another’ (Clayton & Rothstein 1991:3). In this sense, intertextuality is thought to have taken into account those issues addressed by influence, such as background, context, allusions and tradition. In this sense, intertextuality as influence encompasses unconscious, socially prompted types of text formations, modes of conception, styles and other
prior constraints and opportunities for the author (cf Clayton & Rothstein 1991:3).

However, intertextuality as textual influence upstages the agenda of textual influence in a stricter sense in replacing authorial intention and skills. I will rather opt for a distinction as made by Clayton and Rothstein (1991:4), namely that influence has to do with agency and intertextuality has to do with the crossing of texts. Historically, concerns with influence were raised in conjunction with originality and genius. Originality was regarded as a sign of an author’s genius (cf Clayton & Rothstein 1991:5). Thus, if one could trace influences on a particular work, one was able to diminish the author’s genius. Influence in this sense created a particular hierarchy between a superior and an inferior text.

Textual influence brings to the fore the following question: who is the agent and who is the patient? The hierarchy implied by textual influence assumes, in terms of the synoptic gospel criticism, that the Gospel of Mark and an unidentified Quelle influenced Luke or Matthew. It does not say Luke or Matthew (or the authors linked to the Gospels with these names) adapted, altered or modified the Q source or the Markan Gospel. However, the Gospel of Mark or the Q source would not have become precursor texts had it not been for the agency of Luke and Matthew. I am not sure whether the author of the Gospel of Mark intended to influence the other two Gospels. I am also not sure whether the Lukan and Matthean authors had the intention of being influenced by the Markan Gospel. What is apparent, though, is that the authors of Luke and Mark chose to employ Mark’s ideas and words. Influence is subject centered and not related to the problems of language as is the case of intertextuality. Influence conveys the idea of a struggle between one individual and a strong precursor (cf Clayton & Rothstein 1991:9).

Clayton and Rothstein (1991:13–17) identify four movements which eventually led to the decline in the ‘influence’ of influence as a critical notion:

1. Indebtedness to precursor works lost its moral sting and the focus slipped from source to the shaping of the material in the recipient author’s hands (the author had become an active recipient).
2. The occlusion of the personality of the author behind a work led to the notion of a literary work as an autonomous text with a life of its own. Biographical influences of an author became irrelevant.
3. In the patricide or the de-authoring of the text the focus was put more and more on the recipient of the text. That which has served as influence now simply appears as an intertext with which the readers make sense of the text.
4. Influence, with its celebration of individual effort and originality, became ideologically unfit for the more radical agenda of intertextuality’s
suspicion of authorial canons. Every text is public domain and all works are social products.

Influence focuses on a linear, single source and unidirectional relationship, but according to Pondrom (1991:205) it lacks vocabulary to describe the multi-dimensional space created by textuality or the texture of a polymorphous fabric (cf 1991:216). Furthermore, an assertion of influence is an assertion of power (Pondrom 1991:208). But how does the power make itself felt? Pondrom holds that the idea of the source as agent acting directly on the recipient is insufficient to explain the phenomenon. She argues that to understand influence is to understand that one has a dialectic between the agency of human subjects and the agency of texts.

I can agree with her (1991:206) that the concepts of influence and intertextuality can be enriched by giving attention to the implications of the other, but somehow I think intertextuality provides me with a much richer heuristic device to understand why texts are read differently: there is a plurality of voices and it is not always possible to identify the exact source of those voices.

2.3 Introducing the problem of source criticism

The term intertextuality was given by Julia Kristeva on the basis of her analysis of Bakhtin’s concept of dialogicity as an open-ended play between the text of the author and the text of the reader. In her seminal essay, Word, dialogue and novel (1986), where the term ‘intertextuality’ is used and referred to by everyone as the locus classicus for the concept, there is a footnote, instructing the reader to read pages 59-60 in her book La révolution du langage poétique (Kristeva 1974). In the latter, she prefers the term transposition to that of intertextualité, because the latter term ‘denotes [the] transposition of one (or several) sign system(s) into another; but since this term has often been understood in the banal sense of “study of sources”, we [I am not sure whether it is a pluralis majestatis—GS] prefer the term transposition which has

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3 Baxandall (1985:59) regards ‘influence’ a stumbling block to the art critic. It is a curse because of its wrongly grammatical prejudice about who the agent and who the patient is. Instead of suggesting influence, he argues for a perception making the patient the agent. He says: '[The] vocabulary is much richer and more attractively diversified: draw on, resort to, avail oneself of, appropriate from, have recourse to, adapt, misunderstand, refer to, pick up, take on, engage with, react to, quote, differentiate oneself from, assimilate oneself to, assimilate, align oneself with, copy, address, paraphrase, absorb, make a variation on, revive, continue, remodel, ape, emulate, travesty, parody, extract from, distort, attend to, resist, simplify, reconstitute, elaborate on, develop, face up to, master, subvert, perpetuate, reduce, promote, respond to, transform, tackle...'
the advantage of stating precisely that the passage from one signifying system to another demands a new articulation of the thesis—of enunciative and denotative positionality.'

Some explication may be called for here. Firstly, intertextuality as transposition implies a relationship that is more than a relationship between texts. It concerns the crossing of three dimensions of the text (the author, the addressee and exterior texts), at a point where the word in the text belonging to the author as well as the reader intersects with the word’s orientation towards an anterior or synchronic literary corpus (Kristeva 1986:36). Kristeva includes the reader or addressee in the discourse of the text. It is for this reason that Kristeva says ‘each word (text) is an intersection of word (texts) where at least one other word (text) can be read’ and ‘any text is constructed as a mosaic of quotations; any text is the absorption and transformation of another’. It is also in this context which she first used the term ‘intertextuality’.

However, and this is the second point, biblical scholars’ eagerness to swim with the stream, causes them to jump in headlong disregarding the warning that this particular stream requires certain skills. I refer to her remark regarding the link between intertextuality and banal source criticism. Banal source criticism prevails because scholars fail to take into account the structural and systemic character of textual productivity (cf Phillips 1992:276). Intertextuality becomes banal source criticism when it is understood as ‘textual influence’ and parallelism.

From a textual influence point of view, Kristeva’s essay in which she expounds her notion of intertextuality, becomes quite problematical. Her resistance to the discourse of influence plunges her into a contradiction with her own principle of intertextuality (cf Friedman 1991:153). Separating intertextuality from influence is tantamount to saying that intertextuality has its own origin. Friedman (ibid) goes further to assert that in killing influence Kristeva denies its intertextual presence in the notion of intertextuality. Her reference to the banality of source criticism and a redefinition of intertextuality reflects a desire for the purity of an idea, or even a desire to control the dissemination of intertextuality or to exert an influence on the future of the concept. The definition she gave in the English edition of her work of intertextuality, where she denies any link with influence (1980:15), reflects, according to Friedman (1991:154), a desire for a fixed meaning. There is an insistence upon the operation of influence in the dissemination of the concept. She authored the term and it should be used as she originally intended it to be used!

It seems to me that the focus of textual influence and that of intertextuality differs. Textual influence pertains to historical criticism in that it
focuses on the author and his/her production of the text, asking what the influences were that led the author to writing a particular text. By investigating the responses of an author to texts s/he is assumed to have read, one may come closer to a picture of the author as maker (cf Weiner 1991:266). Textual influence is a biographical exercise in determining causes that led the author to use certain sources of influence. Intertextuality is not concerned with biographies of authors but in the production of meaning by the author as reader and by later readers’ reading of the author’s testimony to a particular reading. In looking for textual influence, the critic does bear in mind his or her own position vis-à-vis the author’s text and the assumed sources. With intertextuality, the readers’ position becomes an integral part of the reading process.

3 SOURCE/REDACTION CRITICISM

3.1 On elucidating its primary task

Just after the turn of the century source criticism as influence was defined by Figueiredo (1912:10) as ‘tracing the development of ideas and forms, and the ever new transformation of like or different materials in the diverse literatures of antiquity and of the modern age, and its task is to discover the influence of one literature on others...’ It thus rather rudimentarily inquires into foreign sources of inspiration and suggestion. Source criticism is intent on reconstructing what Figueiredo (1912:10) calls the ‘primordial elements from which the work was formed, the facts that provided the very first suggestions’. It is regarded as an effective means of gauging the author’s intent, mental constitution as well as his originality. With knowledge of the origin of a theme and its prehistory, it is assumed that an author can be separated from what is common to his age and what is original on his part.

This type of literary criticism found a willing audience in biblical criticism, especially within Old Testament scholars struggling with the Pentateuch and its irregularities. One way out was to attribute these irregularities to sources which the authors had used. Assuming that authors display consistency in the way they write (cf Viviano 1993:31), the text should reveal a certain smoothness in the sense of a lack of any irreconcilable tensions or repetitions (cf Fohrer 1973:46). The task of biblical source criticism is to look for these inconsistencies in the text, based upon several indicators, such as breaks in the sequence of events, interruptions in the progression of thought or multiple versions of the same story. These indicators lead the historical critic to the conclusion that the text was composed from different parts; he focuses his attention on what the sources of these different parts were, in which time these sources were reworked and which new total historical view they present in the final text (cf Kraus 1988:242).
Source criticism (as historical criticism), assuming that a text reflects the historical age in which it was produced, argues that the best understanding of a text can only be achieved when it is situated within its historical context and when its authorial intent is explored (cf Viviano 1993:29). But the historical context of production is not so simple when it becomes clear that the text had undergone a complex development in its formation. Furthermore, much of the material (especially of the Old Testament) is anonymous. Authorship and date are not easy to establish. For this reason one finds that source critical analysis rarely describes a literary history of the formation of the text.

Redaction criticism goes even further by stripping the text of its editing in order to get to a core text which presumably originated with the original author. It endeavours to reveal the intentions of the authors as separate agents and the intentions of the editors who created the collection as a collection. Redaction criticism tries to explore those conditions in which authors used their sources. It focuses on the creative role of the author of a text in his (I doubt there is a 'her' among them) reception of the inherited tradition of which the sources are part (Corrington 1993:88).

I understand redaction criticism as those questions posed to the different separated parts of the text in order to see how they had found their way into that final apparently unified text (cf Fohrer 1973:136). Why they did this is not answered. Fohrer (1973:138) says explicitly that redaction criticism should be done value free in the sense that the critic dare not say that a particular redaction is secondary or false. The focus should fall on the redactional history of the text and the new interpretation achieved by the redaction, illuminating theological tendencies of redactors.

The basis of redaction criticism and its search for sources and redactions is the demand for logic. When the modern mind sees an illogical editing in the text, it is offended and has the urge to step in in order to defend the ancient pre-logical writer against what is thought to be the bad taste of the ancient editor (Miles 1981:87).

The text is regarded as a reflection of the author’s (or redactor’s) theology. There is a direct link between what is said in the text and the author’s frame of mind, regardless of any reason (other than the text’s) why particular thoughts are attributed to the author. Consequently, redaction criticism advocates the uniqueness and creativity of the authors of biblical texts with regard to their reception of the inherited tradition (cf Corrington 1993:96).

3.2 Readers’ response-ability and responsibility

The thrust of critical Biblical scholarship has been author-based and not reader-based. A multiplication of sources and the fragmentation of
hypothesised existing sources attest to the tenuous nature of source criticism. Although it initially freed us from reading the biblical text literally, it now suppresses readers of taking a reflective look at their own reading process. Why should they, when historical criticism veils the historical character of biblical scholarship, leaving unexamined critical and theoretical assumptions as well as the cultural conditions that produced, sustained and validated these assumptions, to use the words of the 'Bible and Culture Collective' in their 'Postmodern Bible' (cf Castelli et al 1995:2)? It is not only a question of acknowledging a vast number of ancient texts discovered by archaeology in recent years, but the condition in which they were used by authors as well as the condition in which they are constructed by later (scholarly?) readers.

Contrary to this opinion, McKnight (1993:207) contends that reader-response criticism is capable of accommodating the traditional approaches followed in conventional biblical criticism, albeit in a reconceptualised and relativised way. However, they cannot be substituted for historical or sociological approaches (McKnight 1993:213) because the latter approaches focus still on the text as product, authorship and intention being no longer of primary concern in reader-response criticism.

The Bible and Culture Collective regards reader-response criticism as a complement of historical criticism, an ideological mutant (Castelli et al 1995:44) of historical and biblical narrative criticism (created in the laboratories of the Society of Biblical Literature). As an off-shoot of the union between redaction criticism and narrative criticism it was possible for a particular reception of reader-response criticism to have remained within the theoretical boundaries of a philologically oriented historical criticism (cf Castelli et al 1995:39).

They argue that the unreflective grafting of reader terminology onto historical-critical scholarship has produced an ideological mutation that is blind to both the oppressive and liberating power of its critical discourses (1995:40), disguising the reader-response critic as a redaction critic. They base their view on two considerations (1995:40, 45), namely on

* historical criticism's and reader-response-criticism's mutual belief in the text as an object which controls the reading process, and
* on reader-response's and historical criticism's notion of meaning as referential and reading corresponding to a real sociohistorical referent (1995:45).

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4 The postmodern Bible was a project of ten authors who wrote collectively on topics such as reader-response criticism, structuralist and narratological criticism, poststructuralist criticism, rhetorical criticism, psychoanalytical criticism, feminist and womanist criticism and ideological criticism. They wrote in such a way that one does not know who was responsible for which chapter, thereby raising the question of intertextuality. From the very first word one is to expect different voices.
Firstly, textual patterns control the subjectivity of the reader in reader-response criticism, whereas historical criticism assumes an objective and determinate meaning to be discovered in the text. This refers simultaneously to something outside the text that can also be fairly accurately assessed. Where one should expect reader-response to challenge the idea that meaning is determinable objectively in the text, one finds they still expect the text to guide them to historically verifiable knowledge (cf Castelli et al 1995:40).

Secondly, the reader that is being constructed, is not the implied reader or some original reader, but the reading of the biblical critic. The reader they are realising, is a verification of their own reading strategies and not some first or pristine reader of the text as some would believe (1995:54).

With the focus on the text controlling the reading process, the traditional pluralism of historical criticism can go on unabatedly (Castelli et al 1995:48). There is one unchanging text and all readers stand in an egalitarian relation to the text, differing only with regard to their perspectives and reading models. To admit an unlimited number of readings would concede the inability of a text to control the production of meaning. Readings have merits, especially scholarly merits when a particular reading has dealt better with the facts of the text than other readings. In other words, it has dealt better with textual consistencies and coherencies than other approaches (ibid).

What is the problem with reader-response historical critics? They do not admit to a relationship between their reading and the reading practices of the guild. They mask the role played by power and politics in the adjudication of readings (cf Castelli et al 1995:50). There are no egalitarian relationships between texts and readers. An asymmetry of power between reading communities and even within the same interpretive community manifests itself, barring the text to ‘invite’ an egalitarian response from everyone at the time of its production as well as in each subsequent reception (Castelli et al 1995:58).

The source found is regarded as a real source and not a reader’s construction, whereas one would have expected them to recognise that the uniformity/smoothness or inconsistency/unsmoothness does not belong to the text, but is part of the reader’s own reading strategy. Such strategies may have been established by interpretive communities such as professional guilds, the International Organisation for the Study of the Old Testament, Studiorum Novi Testamenti Societas, the Society of Biblical Literature, the New Testament Society of South Africa and the Old Testament Society of South Africa.5

5 My colleague, Andreas Dierks (to whom I am extremely grateful), wrote the following gloss on the original manuscript: Acronyms are signs of positivistic hegemony. The words have died...acronyms the mere epitaph... R I P (Rot in pall). Within these guilds
What is important to remember is that context, text, cotext, source, reading strategies, sociological environment, cultural history and anthropology all serve as texts and function as one sign in relation to another sign. The text cannot function as a mirror to either a context or a historical event. Context and historical event can only be constructed around the text in order to allow a reading of the text within that constructed context or historical event.

The major problem with reader-response criticism and historical criticism is their veiling of power and politics associated with their readings (Castelli et al 1995:50). Because of the amount of auto-referentiality involved in the reading process, involving individual imagination and an amorphous interpretive community, reader-response and historical critics alike are called up to justify their readings. If reading conventions are acknowledged as the site of meaning production, the formation of these conventions as well as interests involved in maintaining them should be considered (Castelli et al 1995:58): 'textual power is political power'.

The present non-reflectiveness of reader-response historical critics causes a camouflaging of their jargon (cf Castelli et al 1995:58). Without any ideological critique everyone can simply continue to produce meaning encoded in the jargon they see fit for themselves. Historical critics can use reader-response criticism and intertextuality uncritically and reinforce their own ideological agendas. The reason why there is an unreflective shading over from historical criticism to the mould of reader-response is the latter's camouflaging of the reader in the production of meaning. The logical conclusion of reader-response criticism is that texts as well as readers are part of the world of textuality, influencing one another and rendering meaning unstable. Instead, so it seems, its failure to overcome the objectivity of the text in biblical criticism, has opened the door for historical criticism to practice literary criticism as historical criticism in disguise.

Interpretive conventions constitute the different readers. These interpretive conventions are signs that can be read by readers. As Castelli et al (1995:55) put it, 'At this point, the world of textuality threatens to devour the positivistic historian since the notion of history itself, which is a product of an interpretive community, intersects with other discursive communities, and those with still other communities, and so on indefinitely.'
4 HISTORICAL CRITICISM IN THE GUISE OF READER-RESPONSE CRITICISM

4.1 Vorster's use of intertextuality in his reading of Mark

At an Old Testament Society of South Africa meeting in Stellenbosch in 1989, the late Willem Vorster delivered a paper on the in/compatibilities of methods (1989a). He (1989a:60) distinguished between redaction criticism and intertextuality. To him, the interest of the former lies with the intention of the redactor on the basis of assumed sources in the text and the ways he edits those sources (cf also Vorster 1989b:22). Intertextuality, on the other hand, concerns itself with the way texts point to other texts and not authorial intention, forming a network of traces of texts. He then acknowledged that methods based upon poststructuralist insights are hardly compatible with historical-critical assumptions (1989a:61). He hesitated to mix metaphors. To bypass the incompatibility, he suggested that some categories and interests should be dismantled and reassembled (1989a:62).

In the same year Vorster had engaged himself with intertextuality, he wrote an article relating intertextuality and redaction criticism in a reading of Mark 13 (1989b). Taking on his notion of reader as a reader with a repertoire of texts assigning meaning to the text of Mark, Vorster as reader found intratextual relationships with other apocalyptic material in Luke and Matthew as well as intertextual relationships with other New Testament writings and Old Testament books. He even located these 'intertexts'. Of particular importance to him was the discovery of traces of a non-existent source referring to a Jewish Apocalypse. (Vorster referred his readers to Colani's thesis of more than a century ago, postulating such a source). These texts (or sources) are taken by Vorster as traces of other texts known to the critical reader, constituting a network of relationships of texts outside the Gospel of Mark.

From a historical critical point of view, these texts indicated Mark's indebtedness. But since the discussion of these traces fell under Vorster's rubric of intertextual relationships in Mark 13, it was in all probability meant to indicate intertextual relationships. Vorster deliberately brought sources into the discussion of intertextuality. I am not sure whether his goal was that intertextual. His focus was on the author's making of the text and the production of a speech similar to the speeches of Thucydides or the apostles (1989b:25). He emphasised Mark's collecting activity of the possible sayings of Jesus in connection with the future. He alludes to other speeches about the future and bases his claim on the codes of the text.\(^6\) In an article published

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\(^6\) In a paper delivered at the farewell of Bas van Iersel in the Netherlands, to which Vorster had contributed his article (1989b), Ellen van Wolde said that intertextuality
posthumously (Vorster 1993) he uses the notion of intertextuality to get to know the author of Mark. This time, Mark the writer became Mark the reader. Yet, the aim of the exercise is the same: to get to the sources Mark used and the context within which he wrote and the new theology he presented.

His focus on the author and the text urges me to ask a question about Vorster’s reader. With Vorster, it is not the reader who makes the connection with other speeches about the future, but the code in the text. Mark’s production of a speech does not reflect his creativity in putting the possible sayings in a new context, but merely a mechanical stringing together of sayings. From an intertextual point of view, it is of less significance where Mark received these sayings, what the original context was, and how Mark as author handled them. What is more important is the intersection of the original sources, the Markan text and the present reader. Vorster mentioned the sources behind the Markan text. From an intertextual point of view, I would ask: to what end? What is the textual baggage Vorster brought to the Markan text? Or is the problem the age of the text, turning intertextuality into a sense of trying to establish historical intertexts with which a historical reader could have read the text? Does intertextuality of ancient texts not boil down to the historical enterprise of source criticism? Is it possible to construct an original intertextual enterprise in the first or early reading of ancient texts? Is it not in the end an intertextual enterprise of the one purporting to do it, the reader (posing as a historical critic)?

The insistence on the codes of the text, pointing readers to a particular intertext and thereby limiting the reading possibilities of Mark 13 (1989b:25), tells me more about Vorster camouflageing historical critical jargon than about the text (cf Phillips 1992:280). It is not the text that limits reading possibilities but the discursive position of the reader. Furthermore, I do not think Vorster had got rid of the structuralist communication model of Roman Jakobson. No wonder, because, as Botha (1994:106–107) argues, Vorster had an intense passion to let the Bible ‘communicate’, whatever his notion of communication! Intertextuality, at least as I understand it, has to do with texts and texts connecting with other texts. The text as a piece of paper with characters on it on the one hand and the reader as text on the
other hand exist no longer in a subject-object relation to each other, but they are simply collateral.

Why does Vorster want to limit intertextual readings? Is it because of a latent or undeclared desire to give the author control over his textual product? Which product? Is the text constituted before the reading begins or is it constituted during the reading process? If the latter, it is no longer the product of Mark or any other author, but entirely the product of the reader. The presence of the Markan text was then purely incidental. By attributing the limiting factor to the text itself, Vorster does not have to explain the ideology behind the limit. However, as soon as one realises that even that attribute stems from the reader, one should bring to light the ideology behind that limiting factor.

In the reading process not all the signs are deemed by the reader as equally important. Only some will provide interpretive keys to the text (cf Voelz 1989:32). The question as to which signs will be the key factor will depend on the ideology the reader is using in the reading process. I think Vorster has obscured his own discursive position as a reading subject of Mark (or any other text) in pulling into the argument some aspects of intertextuality (that of texts as networks of traces) yet at the same time trying to establish the historical author of a text. Between the two there is a reader within a socio-political context, someone constituted by power, gender, class, race and ethnic terms. It is someone who rewrites the text in his own image as a reader of the text (cf Phillips 1992:279).

Vorster (1993:390), referring to texts he thought Mark would have been acquainted with, lamented the fact that despite all this he did not know exactly how Mark went about creating his story about Jesus. Vorster also acknowledged (1993:391) that the use of an intertextual approach would lead to a total rethinking of the traditional approach of looking for sources and redactional inputs. On the one hand he traced the texts in Mark back to the Old Testament, and indicated the different context in which they were quoted, but then he tried to intertextualise his reading by saying that Mark created a new story with these intertextual codes. And he saw the newness of Mark's story in the apocalyptic theme of the coming of the Son of man (1993:393). He drew a distinction in the end between understanding a text from the perspective of its production (in which he finds a niche for intertextuality) and a text in terms of its growth (in which he situates redaction criticism). To my mind, the growth of the text is part of the production process! According to Vorster's distinction, in terms of production, any intertextual reference comes to be regarded as an integral part of the new text, whereas in terms of growth the final text comes to be seen merely as the result of a causal process.
4.2 Intertextuality in disguise?

I have my doubts about Vorster's use of intertextuality. I cannot dialogue with him (cf Botha, Craffert & Vorster 1994:viii), even though my article constitutes that certain Bakhtinian dialogue (Bakhtin 1969:124) of one partner talking and reacting to the answers of the other (invisible) partner.

Vorster endeavoured to use the intertextual notion to indicate the creative originality of the author of the Gospel of Mark. It is an originality and creativity denied in the past practice of redaction and source criticism of the gospels where practically every piece of text became a precursor text. I am not convinced that Vorster really needed intertextuality to prove Mark's creative originality. Intertextuality is about the interrelatedness of texts, yet I suspect that Vorster hardly perceived the reader also to be text alongside the author being text. He refers to Mark's originality in creating a new text from other texts, but he seems to adhere to a historical Mark as producer, a subject creating an object. He also seemed to adhere to a possible binary view of text/reader. It is as if he still distinguishes between reading and writing, despite claiming Mark to have become a reader/writer.

Would it not have been more in an intertextual spirit for Vorster to have acknowledged his (Vorster's) own textuality in the enterprise of looking at Mark's production? In other words, the historical Mark Vorster purports to see is a Mark of his own creation, a figment of his own imagination. There is no way then that one can, from an intertextual point of view, have a glimpse on the historical Mark or even be able to mark off the production of the Gospel of Mark. The problem is heeding to the poststructuralist framework of intertextuality, yet trying to keep a historical referent in mind.

Intertextuality defers textual meaning constantly. The message Mark wanted to convey to readers would inevitably be deferred by Vorster's own reading of the text. We will never know Mark or his real message. Reading and writing of texts are filtered through the cultural and socio-ideological moulds of their authors and readers. What one says about past readers or writers will always be constructed from the speaking observers' strategies. In other words, the author Vorster wanted to see in the Gospel of Mark, will be tied up with Vorster's own ideology and socio-political background.

To read Mark intertextually (to use the words of Phillips 1992:290) is to speak about the history of Mark's text as a history of readings as well as a way of speaking about other readers' historical locus as readers: 'Every reading and writing has an historical locus and conditionality and an aspect of that location is its intertextual relation to other readings and writings, which every reading and writing by definition exceeds' (cf Phillips 1992:289). One reading is not as good as any other reading. In fact, it is no longer a question
of whose reading is better. It is simply a question of being ethically accountable for your own reading.

The historical critic, if he or she wants to hear intertextual voices, should submit him/herself to systemic review. The biblical text is a ‘thick reality’ (for the term, see Phillips 1992:281), conditioned by institutions, cultures and personal experiences. There are several voices to be heard in the biblical text. They are to be found in the intersecting space of many texts and discourses drawn from a variety of sources and traditions (cf Phillips 1992:272): ‘awaiting some needle (n-eye-dle) work to unravel and resew the fabric into a different pattern’. In other words, these sources and traditions expounded by traditional historical criticism signify different discursive positions in the text, enabling the text to be read otherwise. Phillips (1992:272) compares the text to a patch cloth: ‘[a] patch-work text stitched together and masking signs of earlier sewings; the one thing needed (...) is a sharp eye to probe all the seams in the writing’.

Those elements sought for in the text in source criticism (gaps, repetitions and contradictions) which have been read as evidence for a plurality of sources, now become occasions for ‘observing dynamic, dialogical semiotic processes at work in writing and reading’ (Phillips 1992:287). The text is not read at the expense of or in spite of these fissures, but the reader lingers in the textual weaving (texture), asking what it means for this text to be read from the point of view of its disconnectedness (cf Phillips 1992:288). Intertextuality means the displaying of traces by readers and the recognition of the possibility that these traces can trigger off readings not envisaged by the author. The biblical text is a record of readings and writings that have already taken place, yet point forward to other readings to come.

5 INTERTEXTUALITY AS AN ACT OF INTERPRETATION

Perhaps the first question to answer is with which voice I spoke? Was it a voice committing yet another patricide? Yes, but only inadvertently! Was it a voice similar to Kristeva? Yes, if you mean that I have talked about intertextuality in the mode of influence and source criticism. Where does this article’s intertextual value lie? I would not know. It will depend on my audience and the textual repertoire they have brought to the reading picnic. I have seen in Vorster’s use of intertextuality an ambivalence, another meaning already inscribed by redaction or source criticism. My own apollonistic urge (cf Ijsseling 1994:30) initially forced me to look for some clarification on the use of intertextuality, source criticism and textual influence. What is the clarity I have received?

Source criticism and textual influence on the other hand pertain to two different conceptions regarding (cf Brock et
information: sources are regarded as extrinsic phenomena, independent of human perception whereas intertextuality's assumption of textual links rests upon the ability of the reader to create such links.

form and criticism: textual influence distinguishes between the act of influence and any discussion about it in a typical object-subject relationship, while intertextuality sees the reader and text both as texts refracting one another.

ideology: source criticism and textual influence does not take into account the ideology of the observer, because science, art and morality belong to distinct forms of logic. Intertextuality maintains that all views are ideological, reflecting biases of a particular time.

structure: source criticism and textual influence focus on ordering and structuring, smoothing over inconsistencies and contradictions. Intertextuality uses these contradictions and inconsistencies as the result of human communication where meaning is always deferred.

understanding: source criticism and influence work with parallels between human patterns in order to explain and order systems. Intertextuality emphasises the uniqueness of each situation and the particular nature of the circumstances.

When one deals with textual influence or with intertextuality, one should realise that these two concepts assume two different cultures of understanding. I doubt that the one can be used to obtain the goals of the other: the linear causality of textual influence and source criticism does not address the dialogicity underlying the notion of intertextuality. Similarly, the dialogicity of intertextuality does not address the historical needs of finding the origins of a text. However, intertextuality questions the assumptions with which historical criticism and textual influence work, namely the possibility of ascertaining some sort of extra-textual reference, be it another text or an event. From an intertextual point of view, there will always be a reader, filled to the brim with other texts, constructing such a reference. And the question is no longer whether the construction is true, but why it was constructed in that particular way.

Frow (1990:46), on the basis of text as differential and historical, presenting readers not with the presence of other texts but with traces and tracings of texts, argues that the identification of an intertext is an act of interpretation: 'The intertext is not a real and causative source but a theoretical construct formed by and serving the purposes of a reading'. The identification of an intertext is not the same as the identification of a particular intertextual source. To Frow it is the identifying of the more general discursive structure to which the intertext belongs. Intertextuality differs from source criticism in its stress on interpretation rather than on the establishment of facts.
If intertextuality is indeed an act of interpretation, and if interpretation is taken as production of meaning (cf Beal 1992:31), the question is who and what controls that production. Texts entering via the authors as readers and texts entering via readers as co-producers are emotionally and politically charged (Still & Worton 1990:2). Chambers (1990:144) argues that the condition of the text as a text belonging to a literary system reflects social and political relations. Literarity is a social phenomenon and it entails a text's recognition by a readership which produces intertextuality in the act of perceiving the textual discourse as part of a literary system.

Intertextuality as interpretation is an historical act. It is possible, in the words of Jameson (1981:47), to radically historise its mental operation. He says that even the most formalising kinds of literary analysis carry a theoretical charge whose denial unmasks them as ideological (1981:58). Jameson looks for the political unconscious of the text, the repressed ideological system unrealised in the surface of the text, which he regards as structural limitation or ideological closure (1981:52). In Marxist terms, it means that class position and material interests pose limits on the way one reads texts. Jameson (1981:53) refers to strategies of containment which allow what can be thought to seem internally coherent or a formal unity on its own terms, but repress the non-dit or impensé.

The question I set out to ask, accepting the tu-quoque argument in my own case, is whether the use of intertextuality by historical critics, even those who thought to have made the switch to poststructural thinking, is not still limited by some aspects of historical criticism or the modernist paradigm, barring intertextuality from becoming more than source criticism's textual influence.

WORKS CONSULTED


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